||Sims v. Tennessee
||Whether this court's decision in Hall v. Florida must be applied retroactively on collateral review.
||Payne v. Tennessee
||Whether this court's decision in Hall v. Florida must be applied on collateral review.
||Dusek v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.
||Whether the filing of a putative class action serves, under American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, to satisfy a statute of repose—such as the five-year period in 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(2) applicable to fraud claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934—with respect to the claims of putative class members.
||California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Moody Investors Service
||(1) Whether the filing of a putative class action serves, under the American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah rule, to satisfy the three-year time limitation in Section 13 of the Securities Act with respect to the claims of putative class members (Question granted in Public Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi v. IndyMac MBS, Inc.); and (2) whether a member of a timely filed putative class action may file an individual suit on the same causes of action before class certification is decided, notwithstanding the expiration of the relevant time limitations.
||SRM Global Master Fund Limited Partnership v. The Bear Stearns Companies LLC
||Whether the timely filing of a putative class action serves, under American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, to satisfy the five-year period of repose in 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(2) applicable to fraud claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, with respect to the claims of the class members.
||Blackman v. Gascho
||(1) Whether it is permissible to approve a “claims-made” settlement by calculating its value based on the value of payments to all potential claimants, rather than only payments to actual claimants, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2); and (2) whether it is permissible to approve a settlement that intentionally provides a disproportionate allocation of its pecuniary benefit to class counsel, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2).
||Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics Inc.
||Whether the mere filing of an abbreviated new drug application by a generic pharmaceutical manufacturer is sufficient to subject the manufacturer to specific personal jurisdiction in any state where it might someday market the drug.
||Security University, LLC v. Int'l Information Systems Security Certification Consortium
||What the proper standard under the Lanham Act is for analyzing a defendant's nominative use of a plaintiff's trademark.
||Henson v. Santander Consumer USA
||Whether a company that regularly attempts to collect debts it purchased after the debts had fallen into default is a “debt collector” subject to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
||TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands Group LLC
||Whether the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), which provides that patent infringement actions “may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides[,]” is the sole and exclusive provision governing venue in patent infringement actions and is not to be supplemented by the statute governing “[v]enue generally,” 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which has long contained a subsection (c) that, where applicable, deems a corporate entity to reside in multiple judicial districts.
||Ernst & Young LLP v. Morris
||Whether the collective-bargaining provisions of the National Labor Relations Act prohibit the enforcement under the Federal Arbitration Act of an agreement requiring an employee to arbitrate claims against an employer on an individual, rather than collective, basis.
||National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense
||Whether the Sixth Circuit erred when it held that it has jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F), the portion of the Clean Water Act's judicial review provision which requires that agency actions “in issuing or denying any permit” under Section 1342 be reviewed by the court of appeals, to decide petitions to review the waters of the United States rule, even though the rule does not “issu[e] or den[y] any permit” but instead defines the waters that fall within Clean Water Act jurisdiction.
||Sai v. Transportation Safety Administration
||Whether the collateral order doctrine permits the immediate appeal of a district court order denying appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).
||Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis
||Whether an agreement that requires an employer and an employee to resolve employment-related disputes through individual arbitration, and waive class and collective proceedings, is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, notwithstanding the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.
||Greenberg v. New York
||Whether the exception to federal preemption contained in the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 for state enforcement actions alleging “fraud or deceit” applies to the New York Attorney General's prosecution of an action under state statutes that do not satisfy the federal definition of “fraud” because they do not require proof of scienter.
||Doe v. Backpage.com LLC
||Whether Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which provides that no internet service provider “shall be treated as the publisher or speaker” of internet content that was “provided by another,” precludes a civil lawsuit against a website owner and operator based on its own criminal conduct any time online content created by a third party was part of the chain of causation leading to the plaintiff's injuries.
||Gloucester County School Board v. G.G.
||(1) Whether the court should retain the Auer v. Robbins doctrine despite the objections of multiple justices who have recently urged that it be reconsidered and overruled; (2) whether, if Auer is retained, deference should extend to an unpublished agency letter that, among other things, does not carry the force of law and was adopted in the context of the very dispute in which deference is sought; and (3) whether, with or without deference to the agency, the Department of Education's specific interpretation of Title IX and 34 C.F.R. § 106.33, which provides that a funding recipient providing sex-separated facilities must “generally treat transgender students consistent with their gender identity,” should be given effect.
||Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl
||(1) Whether a state statute that imposes regulatory obligations that apply, as a matter of law, solely to out-of-state companies, but does not use “language explicitly identifying geographical distinctions” in its text, discriminates against interstate commerce; (2) whether the 10th Circuit erred in adopting a “comparative burdens” test for discrimination, under which the burden of regulatory requirements imposed solely on out-of-state retailers may be offset by different obligations on in-state retailers; and (3) whether the 10th Circuit erred in concluding that out-of-state retailers that do not collect Colorado sales tax are “not similarly situated” to their direct in-state competitors who collect Colorado sales tax.
||Ganias v. U.S.
||Whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when law-enforcement officials obtain a warrant based on a predicate unconstitutional search or seizure (as the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits hold), or whether the good-faith exception has no application where a search warrant is issued based on a predicate Fourth Amendment violation (as the Ninth Circuit, Tenth Circuit, Eleventh Circuit, and several state high courts hold).
||Dignity Health v. Rollins
||Whether the church plan exemption applies so long as a pension plan is maintained by an otherwise qualifying church-affiliated organization, or whether the exemption applies only if, in addition, a church initially established the plan.
||Hawkins v. Woods
||(1) Whether a state court “adjudicat[es] on the merits” a petitioner's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim where it neither considers a material part of the record supporting the claim nor grants a timely request for an evidentiary hearing to develop that claim; and (2) whether a federal court that gives deference to a state court decision under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) may hypothesize ways to find important evidence unpersuasive, where the state court's reasoned decision did not consider that evidence.
||Water Splash v. Menon
||Whether the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (“Hague Service Convention”) authorizes service of process by mail.
||Melhorn v. Baltimore Washington Conference of United Methodist Church
||Whether the ministerial exception of the First Amendment absolutely bars breach of contract and tortious conduct lawsuits in situations of illegal conduct or harm to third parties.
||Schell v. OXY USA Inc.
||(1) Whether, if federal law controls the issue of whether attorney's fees and expenses can be awarded for obtaining a declaratory judgment, an award of fees and expenses is “necessary or proper relief . . . against [the losing party],” Declaratory Judgment Act Section 2202, or whether a declaratory judgment is only available to corporations and the upper class, who can afford to pay the hourly fees and expenses required for access to the courthouse; and (2) whether, if state law controls the issue of whether attorney's fees and expenses can be awarded for obtaining a declaratory judgment, the case should be remanded to the district court to consider Kansas state law on the subject because the district judge affirmatively stated that fees and expenses should be awarded if they legally could be.
||Texas Package Stores Assoc. v. Fine Wine and Spirits of North Texas, LLC
||Whether a State may condition access to the wholesale or retail tier of its three-tier alcohol distribution system on in-state residency or physical presence, as the Second and Eighth Circuits have concluded, or whether such requirements are unconstitutional, as the Fifth Circuit held below.
||Weaver v. Massachusetts
||Whether a defendant asserting ineffective assistance that results in a structural error must, in addition to demonstrating deficient performance, show that he was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness, as held by four circuits and five state courts of last resort; or whether prejudice is presumed in such cases, as held by four other circuits and two state high courts.
||Serrano-Mercado v. U.S.
||(1) Whether a district court commits plain error by enhancing a sentence based on a divisible statute without requiring the government to meet its burden of proving that the conviction arose under a qualifying prong of that statute, as five Circuits have held, or whether on plain-error review the burden instead shifts to the defendant to affirmatively show that the alleged predicate offense did not arise under a qualifying prong of the statute, as four Circuits have held; and (2) whether the district court's additional enhancement of Petitioner's sentence based on a second predicate offense under the crime of violence residual clause was error in this case because that clause is unconstitutionally vague.
||Sampson v. U.S.
||Whether, for purposes of the collateral estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the ordinary requirement for collateral estoppel that the prior determination was necessary to the ultimate outcome—which is intended to ensure that a determination received careful attention, and to deny preclusive effect where the outcome deprived a party of the opportunity for appellate review it otherwise would have had—applies to a jury's special findings in a capital case that the prosecution failed to prove certain alleged aggravating factors.
||Universal Music Corp. v. Lenz
||Whether a plaintiff who alleges a statutory violation but no concrete or particularized injury has standing under Article III to seek a remedy of nominal damages.
||Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.
||Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding that the affirmation of good faith belief that a given use of material use is not authorized “by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law,” required under Section 512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), may be purely subjective and, therefore, that an unreasonable belief—such as a belief formed without consideration of the statutory fair use factors—will not subject the sender of a takedown notice to liability under Section 512(f) of the DMCA.
||Kuenzel v. Alabama
||Whether it is fundamentally unfair and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to require a capital habeas petitioner to bring a successive state habeas petition within six months of the discovery of previously unproduced evidence pursuant to Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c), when Alabama Code § 6-5-440 would have simultaneously barred such a suit.
||Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Unaltered Augsburg Confession
||Whether the First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides absolute immunity for defamatory statements made in a religious setting, even if the person defamed is not a member of the religious organization and even if the truth or falsity of the defamatory statement can be adjudicated without considering or interpreting religious doctrine.
||DeKalb County Pension Fund v. Transocean Ltd.
||Whether the filing of a putative class action serves to suspend as to putative class members a period of repose such as the three-year period applicable to claims brought under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a).
||FTS USA, LLC v. Monroe
||(1) Whether the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Due Process Clause permit a collective action to be certified and tried to verdict based on testimony from a small subset of the putative plaintiffs, without either any statistical or other similarly reliable showing that the experiences of those who testified are typical and can reliably be extrapolated to the entire class, or a jury finding that the testifying witnesses are representative of the absent plaintiffs; and (2) whether the procedure for determining damages upheld by the Sixth Circuit, in which the district court unilaterally determined damages without any jury finding, violates the Seventh Amendment.
||Romag Fasteners v. Fossil
||(1) Whether, under Section 35 of the Lanham Act, willful infringement is a prerequisite for an award of infringer's profits for a violation of Section 43(a), which prohibits trademark infringement through false representations regarding the origin, endorsement, or association of goods through the use of another's distinctive mark; and (2) whether and to what extent the defense of laches may bar an award for patent infringement brought within the Patent Act's six-year statutory limitations period, 35 U.S.C. § 286—the same issue this Court granted for plenary review in SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC.
||Denelsbeck v. New Jersey
||Whether the New Jersey Legislature has packed the consequences of a conviction of a third or subsequent traffic offense under New Jersey Statutes Annotated 39:4-50 so as to render the offense “serious” and to entitle offenders to the right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the decisional law of this Court.
||Foster v. Vilsack
||(1) Whether federal courts should defer, under Auer v. Robbins, to an agency construction of an interpretive field manual (“second level Auer deference”), as have the Sixth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit decision below, or not, as the Fifth Circuit has held; and (2) whether the use of a remote comparison site, preselected ten years prior and without notice to the petitioners or an opportunity to be heard, as the sole means of determining that their land supports wetland plants, violates their rights to due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.
||Jamgotchian v. Kentucky Horse Racing Comm’n
||Whether the jail time restriction contained in 810 Kentucky Administrative Regulation 1:015, Section 1 at Article 6(a)-(b), which prohibits purchasers of thoroughbred race horses at claiming races in Kentucky from racing or transferring their horses out of state for a prescribed time period, violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution by impermissibly discriminating against interstate commerce.
||Denault v. U.S.
||(1) Whether the government fails to satisfy the “money or property” requirement of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, when a misrepresentation deprives the purported victim of information about a potential economic benefit, but the purported victim has no contractual right or other legal entitlement to that benefit; and (2) whether the court of appeals must actually determine, and not merely presume, that a sentencing court has discharged its duty under 18 U.S.C. § 3553 and Rita v. United States to state its reasons for imposing a particular sentence after having considered the defendant's arguments and the statutory factors.
||Coventry Health Care of Missouri v. Nevils
||(1) Whether the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (“FEHBA”) preempts state laws that prevent carriers from seeking subrogation or reimbursement pursuant to their FEHBA contracts; and (2) whether FEHBA's express-preemption provision, 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1), which expressly “preempt[s] any State or local law” that would prevent enforcement of “the terms of any contract” between the Office of Personnel Management and a carrier which “relate to the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits (including payments with respect to benefits)[,]” violates the Supremacy Clause.
||Honeycutt v. U.S.
||Whether 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) mandates joint and several liability among co-conspirators for forfeiture of the reasonably foreseeable proceeds of a drug conspiracy.
||Hyosung D&P Co., Ltd. v. U.S.
||(1) Whether deference under Auer v. Robbins should be afforded to the interpretation of an agency regulation offered by the agency's lawyers in a case in which the agency is itself a party; and (2) whether Auer and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. should be overruled.
||Government of Belize v. BCB Holdings Limited
||(1) Whether, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, as applied to a confirmation action to enforce a foreign arbitral award, a foreign forum is per se inadequate because assets in the United States cannot be attached by a foreign court, as the D.C. Circuit has held; or whether forum non conveniens remains a viable doctrine in foreign arbitration confirmation actions if the foreign forum has jurisdiction and there are some assets of the defendant available in the alternative forum, as the Second Circuit held; and (2) whether, under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention, public policy in favor of arbitration yields where confirmation of an arbitral award would be contrary to countervailing public policies such as constitutional separation of powers principles, combating government corruption, and/or international comity.
||Government of Belize v. Newco Limited
||(1) Whether, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, as applied to a confirmation action to enforce a foreign arbitration award, a foreign forum is per se inadequate because assets in the United States cannot be attached by a foreign court, as the D.C. Circuit has held; or is adequate if it has jurisdiction and there are assets of the defendant in the alternative forum, as the Second Circuit held; and (2) whether, under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention, the public policy in favor of arbitration yields where confirmation of an arbitral award would be contrary to the countervailing public policies such as international comity and the policy against tax evasion.
||Davis v. Montana
||Whether a criminal defendant charged with an offense punishable by incarceration is denied due process when he is tried by a non-lawyer judge, where the defendant has no opportunity for a de novo trial before a judge who is a lawyer.
||Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission
||Whether applying Colorado's public accommodations law to compel petitioner to create expression that violates his sincerely held religious beliefs about marriage violates the Free Speech or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.
||OXY USA Inc. v. Schell
||Whether the fact that a pending appeal “played no significant role” in an appellant's voluntary conduct mooting a case, Alvarez v. Smith, is entitled to controlling weight in determining whether a lower court judgment should be vacated, as a majority of courts of appeals have held; or whether a party must make an additional showing of compelling circumstances warranting vacatur, as the Tenth Circuit held in this case.
||Norris v. Tennessee
||(1) Whether the Sixth Circuit's “unreasonable determination of fact” holding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) precluded the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals from relying on the same finding on the same record; (2) whether the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that police had probable cause to arrest the petitioner without giving weight to exculpatory facts known to the arresting officers; and (3) whether the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals erred in rejecting the petitioner's County of Riverside v. McLaughlin claim where police held him without a probable cause hearing for the express purpose of “further investigation.”
||J & K Admin. Mgmt. Services v. Robinson
||Whether an arbitration clause that does not expressly address the availability of class or collective arbitration is sufficient to defer the question of the availability of class or collective arbitration to an arbitrator to decide.
||Saint Peter’s Healthcare System v. Kaplan
||Whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974's church plan exemption applies so long as a pension is maintained by an otherwise qualifying church-affiliated organization, or whether the exemption applies only if, in addition, a church initially established the plan.
||Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton
||Whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974's church plan exemption applies so long as a pension plan is maintained by an otherwise qualifying church-affiliated organization, or whether the exemption applies only if, in addition, a church initially established the plan.
||DBN Holdings v. Int'l Trade Commission
||(1) Whether the International Trade Commission's jurisdiction over the importation of “articles that . . . infringe a valid and enforceable” patent extends to articles that do not infringe any patent; and (2) whether the Federal Circuit erred in affirming the Commission's assessment of civil penalties for the domestic infringement of a patent that has been finally adjudicated to be invalid.
||Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch
||Whether a conviction under one of the seven state statutes criminalizing consensual sexual intercourse between a 21-year-old and someone almost 18 constitutes an “aggravated felony” of “sexual abuse of a minor” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act – and therefore constitutes grounds for mandatory removal.
||Trudeau v. U.S.
||(1) Whether a violation of the criminal contempt statute, 18 U.S.C. § 401, should be classified as a Class A felony under 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (as the First and Fourth Circuits hold), similarly to the closest analogous offense (as the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits hold), or sui generis based on the penalty actually imposed by the court (as the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits hold); and (2) whether the willfulness mens rea of criminal contempt requires the government to prove that the defendant's wrongful conduct was knowing (as the First and Eleventh Circuits hold), reckless (as the Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits hold), or negligent (as the Eighth and Ninth Circuits hold).
||Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership v. Clark
||Whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts a state-law contract rule that singles out arbitration by requiring a power of attorney to expressly refer to arbitration agreements before the attorney-in-fact can bind her principal to an arbitration agreement.
||Flytenow v. Federal Aviation Administration
||(1) What, if any, deference is due an agency's interpretation when it predominately interprets terms of common law in which courts, not administrative agencies, have special competence; (2) whether the circuit court erred when it held, in contravention of this Court's long-standing definition of “common carrier,” that pilots who use the Internet to communicate are “common carriers” when those pilots do not earn a commercial profit or indiscriminately offer to share their travel plans with the general public, thus warranting remand; and (3) whether the circuit court erred in holding that the Federal Aviation Administration could, consistent with the First Amendment, lawfully discriminate against content-based Internet communications because of the message conveyed and the means chosen by pilots to convey it.
||Kaley v. U.S.
||(1) Whether, where an acquitted defendant contested multiple elements of the offense, was acquitted by a general verdict, and can demonstrate that the evidence of a particular element was constitutionally insufficient, the Double Jeopardy Clause collaterally estops the government from prosecuting the defendant for another offense that also requires proof of that particular element; and (2) where an acquitted defendant contested multiple elements of the offense, what burden of proof must he shoulder to establish that a particular element was “necessarily decided” in his favor for purposes of collateral estoppel.
||Overton v. U.S.
||Whether, consistent with this Court's Brady v. Maryland jurisprudence, a court may require a defendant to demonstrate that suppressed evidence “would have led the jury to doubt virtually everything” about the government's case in order to establish that the evidence is material.
||Turner v. U.S.
||(1) Whether, under Brady v. Maryland, courts may consider information that arises after trial in determining the materiality of suppressed evidence; and (2) whether, in a case where no physical evidence inculpated petitioners, the prosecution's suppression of information that included the identification of a plausible alternative perpetrator violated petitioners' due process rights under Brady.
||Meshal v. Higgenbotham
||Whether a U.S. citizen may bring a Bivens claim in the absence of any other remedy when federal law enforcement officers unlawfully detain and grossly mistreat him during a criminal counterterrorism investigation abroad.
||Kreipke v. Wayne State University
||(1) Whether Wayne State University (WSU), a unique, autonomous institution, free from all relevant state control, who receives a minority share of its funding from the State, and who is responsible for its own debts, is a “person” under the False Claims Act (FCA); and (2) whether WSU's Board of Governors, a creation of the State and a properly formed corporation in every respect, is a “person” under the FCA.
||SSC Mystic Operating Company, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board
||(1) Whether the National Labor Relation Board's interpretation of § 153(b), which authorizes the Board to delegate certain statutory powers to its regional directors, is entitled to any level of judicial deference; and (2) whether the Board's interpretation of § 153(b), that regional directors can exercise the statutory powers delegated to them by the Board regardless of whether the Board has a quorum, should be upheld.
||Impression Products v. Lexmark Int'l
||(1) Whether a “conditional sale” that transfers title to the patented item while specifying post-sale restrictions on the article's use or resale avoids application of the patent exhaustion doctrine and therefore permits the enforcement of such post-sale restrictions through the patent law’s infringement remedy; and (2) whether, in light of this Court’s holding in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. that the common law doctrine barring restraints on alienation that is the basis of exhaustion doctrine “makes no geographical distinctions,” a sale of a patented article – authorized by the U.S. patentee – that takes place outside of the United States exhausts the U.S. patent rights in that article. CVSG: 10/12/2016.
||SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. King Drug Co. of Florence
||Whether the Third Circuit’s sweeping holding that a patentee’s grant of an exclusive license must undergo antitrust scrutiny by courts and juries - even though such a license is specifically permitted under the patent laws - is inconsistent with this Court’s decision in FTC v. Actavis and decades of this Court’s earlier precedents. CVSG: 10/03/2016.
||Howell v. Howell
||Whether the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act preempts a state court’s order directing a veteran to indemnify a former spouse for a reduction in the former spouse’s portion of the veteran’s military retirement pay, where that reduction results from the veteran’s post-divorce waiver of retirement pay in order to receive compensation for a service-connected disability. CVSG: 10/17/2016.