||Adar v. Smith
||(1) Whether a state violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause when an executive official selectively disregards some out-of-state judgments of adoption based on policy assessments of the wisdom of those judgments; (2) whether 42 U.S.C. Â§ 1983 provides a remedy for a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause; and (3) whether a state violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when, based on its disapproval of the unmarried status of a childâ€™s adoptive parents, the state refuses to issue the child with an accurate, amended birth certificate.
||Akamai Technologies v. Limelight Networks
||Whether a party may be liable for infringement under either section of the patent infringement statute, 35 U.S.C. §271(a) or § 271(b), where two or more entities join together to perform all of the steps of a process claim.
||Alabama Department of Revenue v. CSX Transportation
||Whether a state “discriminates against a rail carrier” in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b)(4) when the state generally requires commercial and industrial businesses, including rail carriers, to pay a sales-and-use tax but grants exemptions from the tax to the railroads’ competitors.
||Alaska v. Jewell
||(1) Whether the Ninth Circuit properly held — in conflict with this Court’s decisions — that the federal reserved water rights doctrine authorizes the unprecedented federal takeover of Alaska’s navigable waters sanctioned by the 1999 Rule; and (2) whether the Ninth Circuit properly proceeded on the premise — which also conflicts with this Court’s decisions — that the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act could be interpreted to federalize navigable waters at all given Congress’s silence on the Act’s application to navigable waters.
||Alpha I, LP v. U.S.
||1) Whether the penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6662 for an overvaluation misstatement is applicable to any underpayment of tax that may result from adjustments made by the IRS in a notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (“FPAA”) issued to a partnership, when that partnership concedes the adjustments asserted in the FPAA on a ground that is separate from valuation.
2) Whether a court has jurisdiction in a partnership-level proceeding under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (“TEFRA”) (i.e., 26 U.S.C. §§ 6221—6233) to determine whether a partner’s transfer of his or her partnership interest was a sham, based on the possibility that the trial court might make findings not urged by either party but that would support the court’s jurisdiction.
||Amgen Inc. v. Harris
||(1) Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding
that respondents, in seeking to prove their claims under
ERISA, could invoke the presumption of class-wide
reliance approved by this Court for securities claims in
Basic Inc. v. Levinson; (2) whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding
that a fiduciary of a company’s employee-retirement
plan must act — with respect to publicly-traded securities —
on non-public information about the company in
order to avoid liability under ERISA; and (3) whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding
that the “presumption of prudence,” which protects
ERISA fiduciaries from liability in certain circumstances,
applies only if the relevant retirement-plan
language requires or encourages a fiduciary to invest in
the employer’s own stock.
||Amgen Inc. v. New York
||(1) Whether a claim can be deemed “false or fraudulent” within the meaning of the False Claims Act because the claimant violated a statutory, regulatory or contractual obligation and, at the time the claim was submitted, the government payor could have but was not required to deny the claim on that ground; and (2) whether the provisions of the False Claims Act can be used to enforce compliance with statutes, regulations, contractual obligations, or other program requirements, even though no statute, regulation or contractual provision expressly conditions payment on compliance with those obligations.
||Amy and Vicky, Child Pornography Victims v. U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington
||Whether, when the Mandatory Restitution for Sexual Exploitation of Children Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2259, provides that a court “shall order restitution” for a victim of child pornography “in the full amount of the victim’s losses,” which are defined to include several specified categories as well as “any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate cause of the offense,” a defendant is excused from paying restitution for the itemized loss categories unless there is proof that the victim’s losses were the proximate result of an individual defendant’s child pornography crime.
||Arab Bank v. Linde
||(1) Whether the Second Circuit erred when, in
conflict with decisions of this Court and other circuits
and in disregard of international comity and
due process, it failed to vacate severe sanctions for
non-production of records located in countries where
production would subject the Bank to criminal penalties,
hobbling the Bank’s defense; and (2) whether the courts below erred by failing to
dismiss plaintiffs’ Alien Tort Statute claims, as the Second Circuit’s
and this Court’s decisions in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum require.
||Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius
||(1) Whether the petitioners have standing to advance the
claim that the mandate by the Department of Health and Human Services requiring them to provide their employees with abortion-inducing drugs, contraceptive drugs or devices, and sterilization violates the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) by forcing
individual business owners to violate their
religious beliefs when governing the corporation
through which they do business upon pain of ruinous
consequences; and (2) whether the mandate imposes a substantial
burden on petitioners’ exercise of religion within
the meaning of the RFRA by coercing them to violate their religious
convictions when conducting business upon
pain of ruinous consequences.
||Avis Budget Group v. Alaska Rent-A-Car
||Whether the erroneous deprivation of a
peremptory challenge in federal court, which allows
a prospective juror who should have been stricken to
sit on the jury, is subject to harmless-error review.
||B&B Hardware v. Hargis Industries
||(1) Whether the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s finding of a likelihood of
confusion precludes respondent from relitigating that issue
in infringement litigation, in which likelihood of
confusion is an element; and (2) whether, if issue preclusion does not apply, the
district court was obliged to defer to the Board’s finding
of a likelihood of confusion absent strong evidence
to rebut it.
||Bass Pro Outdoor World, L.L.C. v. Kelly
||1. Given that this Court has said that a single digit
maximum ratio between punitive damages and
compensatory damages is appropriate in all but the
most exceptional of cases, but greater ratios may
comport with due process when “a particularly
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of
economic damages,” what factors determine whether
conduct is “particularly egregious,” whether economic
damages are “small” as opposed to nominal, and
what upper limits apply once a single digit ratio is
2. When economic damages are above nominal, but
arguably “small,” does a punitive damages award
that bears a triple-digit ratio to the compensatory
damages violate Ppetitioner’s due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
||Beard v. Aguilar
||Whether the Ninth Circuit’s grant of habeas relief in this case violated 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
||Bianchi v. Chrzanowski
||(1) Whether, when an assistant state’s attorney testified
against the State’s Attorney pursuant to a subpoena,
concerning alleged improper influence by
the State’s Attorney as to a plea agreement entered
into between the assistant state’s attorney
and a defense attorney, the assistant state’s
attorney was acting within his job duties such that his
speech was not protected by the First Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States; and (2) whether the contours of any First Amendment protections
that might have attached to the assistant
state’s attorney’s testimony were sufficiently clear
such that a reasonable official would understand
that by taking adverse employment action against
the assistant state’s attorney, the official’s actions
would be violating the assistant state’s attorney’s
free speech right.
||Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives v. Gill
||(1) Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage
Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, violates the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; and (2) whether the court below erred by inventing and applying to Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act a previously unknown standard of equal protection review.
||Brewer v. Diaz
||Whether the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ignored this Court’s precedent and erred in holding that Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) Section 38-651(O) (Section O) violates the Equal Protection Clause by limiting healthcare benefits to state employees’ spouses and dependents – and thus not extending such benefits to state employees’ domestic partners – given that a) Section O is facially neutral and there is no evidence that the Legislature intended to discriminate based on sexual
orientation; b) Section O furthers the State’s interests
in promoting marriage while also eliminating the additional expense and administrative burdens involved in providing healthcare benefits to state employees’ domestic partners; and c) the court’s reason for finding that Section O discriminates against gay and lesbian state employees was that Arizona prohibits same-sex marriage.
||Brewington v. North Carolina
||Whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment permits a forensic analyst who did not
observe or participate in any of the forensic testing at
issue to tell the jury the conclusions that another
analyst set forth in a testimonial forensic report – so
long as the testifying analyst offers an “independent
opinion” that, based on reviewing the other analyst’s
report and notes, she agrees with other analyst’s
||Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP
||(1) Whether the Federal Circuit departed from the standard this Court articulated in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing for “arising under” jurisdiction of the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. §1338, when it held that state law legal malpractice tort claims which involve no actual patents and have no impact on actual patent rights come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts because a patent was involved in the underlying litigation; and (2) whether the Federal Circuit’s overly broad and mistaken standard has caused a conflict among state courts and federal courts regarding federal jurisdiction with some other courts declining to assume federal jurisdiction of these state law tort cases.
||Calhoun v. U.S.
||(1) Whether it is fundamental or structural error not amenable to meaningful review for the government to resort to racial prejudice or stereotypes as an indicia of guilt; (2) If it is not structural error, is it always plain error for the government to interject racial stereotypes into a trial in order to show the defendant’s guilt?
||CarMax Auto Superstores California, LLC v. Fowler
||Whether California’s “Gentry rule” – under which
class-action waivers in employment arbitration
agreements are invalid if “a class arbitration is likely
to be a significantly more effective practical means
of vindicating the rights of the affected employees
than individual litigation or arbitration,” Gentry v. Superior Court of L.A. County, is
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act in light of
this Court’s decisions in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.
||Carpenter v. U.S.
||(1) Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause entitles such a defendant to appellate review of his claim that the government failed to introduce legally sufficient evidence before he is subjected to the opprobrium, embarrassment, and toll of retrial on the same charges; (2) whether such a defendant is at least entitled to cross-appeal the district court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal where the government takes an interlocutory appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 from the district court’s grant of a new trial.
||Carrion v. Agfa Construction
||Whether the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 3141-
3148, preempts a state common law cause of action
for breach of contract.
||Cassens Transport Company v. Brown
||Whether an employee who suffered a physical injury in the workplace asserts an injury to “business or property” within the meaning of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), by alleging that the employee was denied workers’ compensation benefits for the physical injury or that the employee’s ability to pursue a benefits claim stemming from the physical injury was impaired.
||Catsimatidis v. Irizarry
||Whether an individual may be held personally liable
for a corporation’s violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act merely
because the individual had general control over corporate
affairs, but exercised no personal responsibility
over the conduct that caused the violation.
||Cerdant v. DHL Express (USA)
||Is a class representative in a putative class action faced with a Rule 68 offer of judgment in excess of its potential recovery that makes no reference to class claims required to reject said offer, proceed to trial, and bear all of the costs of continuing litigation in order to preserve its right to appellate review of a denial of class certification?
||Cerdant v. DHL Express (USA)
||Is a class representative in a putative class action faced with a Rule 68 offer of judgment in excess of its potential recovery that makes no reference to class claims required to reject said offer, proceed to trial, and bear all of the costs of continuing litigation in order to preserve its right to appellate review of a denial of class certification?
||Comptroller v. Wynne
||Whether the United States Constitution prohibits a state
from taxing all the income of its residents — wherever
earned — by mandating a credit for taxes paid on
income earned in other states.
||Convergent Outsourcing v. Zinni
||Does an offer to provide a plaintiff with all of the relief he has requested, including more than the legal amount of damages plus costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, fail to moot the underlying claim because the defendant has not also offered to agree to the entry of a judgment against it?
||Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Company, LLC v. Owens
||Whether a defendant seeking removal to
federal court is required to include evidence
supporting federal jurisdiction in the notice of
removal, or is alleging the required “short and
plain statement of the grounds for removal”
||Department of Health and Human Services v. Massachusetts
||Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7, violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the same sex who are legally married under the laws of their state.
||Derr v. Maryland
||Whether the Sixth Amendment permits the state’s
expert witness to present to a jury the results of
forensic tests that she neither performed nor witnessed
as substantive evidence to support her conclusion that
petitioner was the source of DNA evidence, when the
State does not call the analysts who performed the
tests as witnesses or show that they are unavailable
and previously subject to cross-examination.
||Deyton v. Keller
||(1) For purposes of federal habeas review, has the U.S. Supreme Court clearly established the rule that due process prohibits a state court judge from taking into account his own religious beliefs in sentencing a defendant? (2) Did the state court judge violate petitioners’ due process rights when the judge told petitioners, following their guilty plea to the robbery at a church, that they had stolen God’s money intended for the establishment of a religious kingdom on earth and then sentenced each of them to 53 to 71 years? (3) Did the sentences of petitioners, who were adolescents without any serious prior record and did not harm anyone in the robbery, violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment?
||Drake v. Jerejian
||(1) Whether the Second Amendment secures a
right to carry handguns outside the home for self-defense; and (2) whether state officials violate the Second
Amendment by requiring that individuals wishing to
exercise their right to carry a handgun for self-defense
first prove a “justifiable need” for doing so.
||Droganes v. U.S.
||Whether a court has the inherent authority to
impose monetary sanctions against the government
despite the doctrine of sovereign immunity, when the
government acts in bad faith by making
misrepresentations to the court and by violating and
ignoring the terms of an otherwise valid and
enforceable court order.
||Dunn v. U.S.
||(1) Whether a conspiracy charge under 18 U.S.C. § 371 which alleges violations of both the defraud and offense prongs of that statute presents one or two offenses; (2) whether an ends-of-justice finding necessary to grant an excludable continuance under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7), can be inferred based solely on the context in which the district court granted a continuance rather than the court’s reasoning “on the record" and (3) whether a sentencing court violates the Ex Post Facto Clause by using the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, rather than the Guidelines in effect at the time of the offense, when the newer Guidelines create a significant risk that a defendant will receive a higher sentence.
||Easton Area School District v. B.H.
||Whether the Third Circuit erred in constructing a new
test for the application of Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser that would
prohibit regulation of lewd expression in the
public schools, even in the absence of issue
preclusion; (2) whether the Third Circuit misapplied the narrowest
grounds doctrine to hold that Morse v. Frederick dictated a
modification of the holding in Fraser by creating
a two-part test for regulation of expression
controlled by Fraser; and (3) whether the Third Circuit abused its discretion in failing
to give due deference to school administrators’
objectively reasonable determination that a
sexual double entendre constituted lewd or vulgar
speech which could be prohibited under Fraser.
||Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock
||Whether applying a state public-accommodations
statute to require a photographer to create
expressive images and picture-books conveying
messages that conflict with her religious beliefs
violates the First Amendment’s ban on compelled
||Elmbrook School District v. Doe
||(1) Whether the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from conducting public functions such as high school graduation exercises in a church building, where the function has no religious content and the government selected the venue for reasons of secular convenience; (2) whether the government “coerces” religious activity in violation of Lee v. Weisman and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe where there is no pressure to engage in a religious practice or activity, but merely exposure to religious symbols; and (3) whether the government “endorses” religion when it engages in a religion-neutral action that incidentally exposes citizens to a private religious message.
||Fleming v. Moswin
||(1) Whether plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial when defendants' race-neutral explanation for their peremptory challenge of a black venireperson was not supported by the record; and (2) whether the preliminary issue of plaintiffs having established a prima facie showing is moot.
||Florida v. Georgia
||Whether Florida is entitled to equitable apportionment of the
waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin and appropriate injunctive
relief against Georgia to sustain an adequate flow of
fresh water into the Apalachicola Region.
||Fugit v. U.S.
||Under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), one may not entice a minor “to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense.” Does the “sexual activity” element require the defendant to make or attempt physical contact with a minor, as the Seventh Circuit holds, or may a single Internet chat and phone call with no attempted physical contact with a minor satisfy the element, so long as the defendant caller was involved in the “active pursuit of [his own] libidinal gratification,” as the Fourth Circuit holds.
||Fulmer v. Texas
||(1) Texas has enacted a statute, Texas Penal Code § 21.02, which
criminalizes continuous sexual abuse of a child or children under age
14. A jury is permitted to convict someone without unanimously
agreeing exactly which two acts occurred. All the jury has to
unanimously decide is that any two acts (24 total acts if there are 12
jurors) occurred over a period lasting 30 days or more. Does this
statute violate the federal constitutional requirements of a unanimous
jury verdict in criminal prosecutions or due process of law? Or is the
statute constitutional because, as the Texas appellate courts have held,
the “two or more acts” element is only the “manner and means” of
committing this offense, and therefore the jury does not need to
unanimously agree which two acts occurred in order to convict;
(2) Texas Government Code § 508.145(a) prohibits someone convicted of
continuous sexual abuse of a child or children under age 14 from
being parole eligible. However, someone convicted of a multiple,
specific acts of abuse against a child or children under age 14 remains
parole eligible. Does this legislative classification violate the federal
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws, especially
when, as here, a defendant is convicted of both continuous sexual
abuse, which is not parole eligible, and specific acts of abuse, which
are parole eligible.
||Gallow v. Cooper
||Whether a federal court can consider new evidence to support a state prisoner’s application for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), when the state court record was not developed as a result of incompetent and likely conflicted post-conviction counsel.
||Galloway v. Mississippi
||(1) Whether the Mississippi Supreme Court erred in
holding that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment permits a forensic analyst to inform the
jury of the results of forensic testing of DNA evidence
that she did not participate in or observe, so long as
she is “familiar with each step of the complex testing
process conducted by” the non-testifying expert and
“conducted her own [comparison] analysis” of the
DNA profiles generated by the non-testifying expert; (2) whether the court below erred in holding that the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments permit the
exclusion from a capital trial of a defendant’s
proffered evidence of the harsh and suffering prison
conditions he would face if the jury elected a sentence
of life imprisonment instead of execution, where such
evidence rebuts the argument that the death penalty
is needed to hold the defendant accountable, rebuts
the State’s suggestion of future dangerousness, and
is constitutionally relevant mitigation evidence; and (3) whether a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s
requirement that jurors be permitted to form a
reasoned moral response to the defendant’s
background, character, and crime may be excused as
harmless error, as the court below and some United
States courts of appeals have found, or whether such
constitutional error must require automatic reversal of the
death sentence, as other United States courts of
appeals have held.
||Geneva-Roth Ventures v. Kelker
||Whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts Montana’s rule subjecting
arbitration provisions in standard-form contracts
to a heightened standard of consent that does
not apply to other terms in form contracts.
||Gomez v. Stephens
||(1) Whether, under the Antiterrorism and Death Penalty Act of 1996, a Franks v. Delaware hearing is a "critical stage of the criminal proceedings" as envisioned in United States v. Cronic, where petitioner's attorney's presence is required by the Sixth Amendment; (2) whether the court of appeals erred when it held that petitioner's right to his attorney's presence at a Franks hearing was not violated when the state trial court held such a hearing; (3) whether petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross examine his accusers was violated by the absence of his attorney at his Franks hearing; (4) whether petitioner's attorney's absence from his Franks hearing was a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver by petitioner as required by Johnson v. Zerbst; and (5) whether a conflict of interest arose and existed due to petitioner's attorney's absence and therefore lack of representation at the Franks hearing.
||Grounds v. Sessoms
||(1) Whether, when the suspect in custody makes an ambiguous or equivocal reference to counsel before receiving Miranda warnings, “clearly established Federal law” as determined by this Court forbids the police from advising the suspect of his Miranda rights and then conducting an interrogation after he waives them; and (2) whether, under the “highly deferential” standard of review set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), it was objectively unreasonable for the state court to conclude that respondent did not unambiguously and unequivocally invoke his right to counsel before receiving Miranda warnings.
||Hammond v. Sheets
||(1) Whether the federal courts below correctly decided to exclude Petitioner’s evidence provided in support of the factual basis of his claim that ineffective assistance of counsel violated his Sixth Amendment rights during his state trial; (2) whether Ohio law operated to establish a right to assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, as well as a right to effective assistance of counsel through the Sixth Amendment, or whether it operates to excuse procedural defaults bringing a substantive claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in an initial-review collateral proceeding where there was either no counsel or ineffective counsel; (3) whether the federal courts below correctly decided that sufficient evidence supports Petitioner’s conviction for rape as required by due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
||Hegab v. Long
||Whether a Federal District Court may review a
decision of a federal agency revoking the security
clearance of an employee where the employee has
made a colorable claim that the decision revoking his
clearance was in violation of his rights under the First,
Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
||Heien v. North Carolina
||Whether a police officer’s mistake of law can
provide the individualized suspicion that the Fourth
Amendment requires to justify a traffic stop.
||Hoffner v. Walker
||Whether the Michigan Court of Appeals’ prejudice ruling under Strickland v. Washington
rested on “an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement” so as to justify habeas relief. Metrish v. Lancaster (quoting Harrington v. Richter).
||Howell v. Tennessee
||(1) Whether, in proceedings under Atkins v. Virginia , the Sixth Amendment requires a state to prove the absence of mental retardation (intellectual disability) beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, because death is not within the permissible range of sentences for a person who is intellectually disabled; (2) whether this Court should grant certiorari, vacate, and remand for further consideration of Howell's Sixth Amendment claim in light of Alleyne v. United States ; (3) whether it violates the Eighth Amendment and Atkins for a state court to determine a petitioner's I.Q. without appropriately applying scientifically reliable standards for the assessment of intellectual functioning such as the Standard Error Of Measurement (SEM) of I. Q. tests or the "Flynn Effect," a recognized phenomenon requiring the downward adjustment of raw I.Q. scores to reflect the petitioner's actual I.Q.; (4)
whether the Eighth Amendment and Atkins allow a state to use standards for assessing adaptive deficits that contravene scientifically accepted clinical practice and that focus on an individual's abilities rather than his actual deficits, when such deficits satisfy clinical standards for intellectual disability; and (5) whether it violates due process and/or equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment for a state supreme court to require consideration of SEM and the Flynn Effect in some Atkins cases but to refuse their consideration to the petitioner.
||Hussain v. Obama
||(1) Whether the Court of Appeals failed to apply the governing preponderance of the evidence standard in affirming the denial of petitioner's habeas corpus petition, thus denying him the meaningful review mandated by Boumediene v. Bush; and (2) whether the court of appeals improperly shifted the burden of proof to petitioner to disprove affiliation with al Qaeda or the Taliban at the time of his capture.
||James v. Federal Election Commission
||When appellant wishes to take funds that may be legally contributed to political action committees and party committees, and instead contribute those same funds directly to additional candidate committees, whether the three-judge district court erred in dismissing her facial and as-applied challenge to Section 307(b) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3)(A), which imposes a limit of $37,500 on total contributions to all individual candidates.
||James v. U.S.
||Whether forensic pathology reports are testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.
||Kansas v. Swindler
||(1) Whether, when law enforcement officers provide Miranda v. Arizona
warnings prior to conducting a voluntary, noncustodial
interview, they must cease all questioning
if the interview subject subsequently expresses a
desire to stop the interview, or whether the officers may
continue the questioning without violating any
constitutional requirements; and (2) whether, if what concededly began as a voluntary, noncustodial
interview by police arguably becomes a
custodial situation, the fact of “custody” alone
makes any subsequently obtained confession
involuntary, or must a court employ a “totality of
the circumstances” analysis, with custody simply
being one factor.
||Kellogg Brown & Root Services v. U.S. ex rel. Carter
||(1) Whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations
Act – a criminal code provision that tolls the
statute of limitations for “any offense” involving fraud
against the government “[w]hen the United States is
at war,” 18 U.S.C. § 3287, and which this Court has
instructed must be “narrowly construed” in favor of
repose – applies to claims of civil fraud brought by
private relators, and is triggered without a formal
declaration of war, in a manner that leads to indefinite
tolling; and (2) whether, contrary to the conclusion of numerous
courts, the False Claims Act’s so-called “first-to-file”
bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) – which creates a race
to the courthouse to reward relators who promptly
disclose fraud against the government, while prohibiting
repetitive, parasitic claims – functions as a “onecase-
at-a-time” rule allowing an infinite series of duplicative
claims so long as no prior claim is pending
at the time of filing.
||Kentucky v. King
||(1) Whether the hot pursuit exception to the warrant requirement is contingent on a subjective determination of pursuit; and (2) what constitutes a serious offense for purposes of dispensing with the warrant requirement; and what test or tests is proper to determine when warrantless entry is permissible.
||Khaburzania v. New York
||Whether this Court's mandate that by virtue of the Constitution, counsel must advise their clients of the immigration consequences of a criminal plea is applicable retroactively.
||Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises
||Whether this Court should overrule Brulotte v. Thys Co., which held that “a patentee’s use of a royalty
agreement that projects beyond the expiration date of
the patent is unlawful per se.”
||Kwong v. Holder
||(1) Whether an abstract of judgment, which is prepared by a court clerk for sentencing purposes after a defendant’s guilty plea and without the defendant’s input, qualiﬁes as a conclusive record made or used in adjudicating guilt sufﬁcient to determine the nature of a prior conviction under Shepard v. United States; and (2) whether a burglary conviction in a state that does not require an unlawful or unprivileged entry can be considered a crime of violence under Leocal v. Ashcroft, when it is not a violent felony under Taylor v. United States.
||Lee v. Thomas
||Whether federal habeas courts should
apply Harrington v. Richter’s presumption to a state
court’s reasoned decision in order to
rehabilitate the state court’s unreasonable
application of clearly established
||Liberty University v. Geithner
||(1) Whether the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) bars courts from deciding the limits of federal power to enact a novel and unprecedented law that forces individuals into the stream of commerce and coerces employers to reorder their business to enter into a government-mandated and heavily regulated health insurance program when the challenged mandates are penalties, not taxes, where the government argues Congress never intended the AIA to apply, and where the petitioners are currently being forced to comply with various parts of the law and thus have no other alternative remedy but the present action; (2) whether Congress exceeded its enumerated powers by enacting a novel and unprecedented law that forces individuals who otherwise are not market participants to enter the stream of commerce and purchase a comprehensive but vaguely defined and burdensome health insurance product, and if so, to what extent can this essential part of the statutory scheme be severed; and (3) whether Congress exceeded its enumerated powers by enacting a novel and unprecedented law that forces private employers into the health insurance market and requires them to enter into third-party contracts to provide a comprehensive but a vaguely defined health insurance product to their employees and extended beneficiaries, and if so, to what extent can this essential part of the statutory scheme be severed.
||Lipsey v. U.S.
||Whether a defendant – who has fraudulently
obtained mortgages and thus owes restitution under
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B) – returns “any part” of the
property lost when lenders acquire title to the real
property that served as collateral to secure the mortgages.
||Long v. U.S.
||Whether, if a prosecutor makes a promise to a criminal
defendant in exchange for a guilty plea, but that
promise is omitted from a writing purporting to
memorialize the full terms of the plea agreement, the parol evidence rule bars a court from
considering evidence of the government's promise.
||Lucas v. U.S.
||Whether the sentencing terms of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) (i)-(iii) constitute escalating, fixed sentences, or instead mere minimum sentences with implicit maximums of life in prison.
||Lyons v. Mitchell
||Whether a habeas petitioner’s Federal constitutional claim of denial of due process in the admission against him of gruesome photographic evidence has been “adjudicated on the merits” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) where the State court decision affirming the trial judge’s admission of such evidence in the exercise of her discretion never addressed the petitioner’s claim of denial of Federal due process in its admission.
||Madison County v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York
||Whether the 300,000-acre ancient Oneida reservation in New York still exists, neither disestablished nor diminished, despite (1) the federal government’s actions taken in furtherance of disestablishment (including, but not limited to, the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek); (2) this Court’s holding in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York that the Oneida Indian Nation of New York cannot exercise sovereignty over lands it purchases in the ancient reservation area; and (3) this Court’s finding in that case that land in the ancient reservation area has not been treated as an Indian reservation by the federal, state or local governments for nearly two centuries.
||Madrigal-Barcenas v. Holder
||Whether the plain text of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which states that a noncitizen is ineligible for cancellation of removal if
he has been convicted of an offense “relating to a
controlled substance," requires that a drug
paraphernalia conviction involve or relate to a
controlled substance that is actually listed in the
federal schedules of controlled substances in order to
render a noncitizen ineligible for cancellation of
||Maersk Drilling USA v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling
||Whether offering, negotiating, and entering into
a contract in Scandinavia to provide services using a
potentially patented device constitutes an “offer to
sell” or “sale” of an actually patented device “within
the United States,” under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
||Mariner’s Cove Townhomes Association v. U.S.
||Whether, as the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits and numerous state supreme courts have held, “the right to collect assessments, or real covenants generally,” constitute compensable property under the Takings Clause or whether, as the Fifth and D.C. Circuits and a smaller group of state supreme courts have held, they constitute noncompensable property.
||Marrero v. U.S.
||(1) Whether this court should grant certiorari to resolve the circuit split regarding what a sentencing court can consider when applying the modified categorical
Approach? Specifically, some courts of appeals have held that sentencing
courts can consider charging documents and plea colloquies only to
determine which crime the defendant committed when his prior offense
Occurred. Others have held that sentencing courts can also consider those
documents to determine how the defendant committed the prior offense and (2)
whether after the Supreme Court’s decision in Begay v. United States,
the question of
whether a crime is a crime of violence depends upon whether the elements require
Conduct which is “violent, purposeful, and aggressive.” Should the analysis of
Begay apply, even if an offense is enumerated in application note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 4b1.2,
the definition section of the career offender guidelines?
||Martinez v. Illinois
||Whether a defendant is acquitted for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, where a court grants a motion for directed verdict after the prosecution refuses to present any evidence at trial to the empaneled and sworn jury.
||Massachusetts v. Dept. of Health and Human Services
||(1) Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7, violates the Tenth Amendment; and (2) whether Section 3 of DOMA violates the Spending Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
||McCormick v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
||(1) Whether assets which a Medicaid recipient divested during her lifetime fall within that individual’s “estate” as deﬁned in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4); and (2) if not, whether 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) preempts Idaho statutes and regulations that authorize the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare to assert Medicaid recovery claims against assets in which the Medicaid recipient did not have any legal title to or interest in at the time of the recipient’s death.
||Medtronic v. Stengel
||Whether the Medical
Device Amendments to the federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act preempt a state-law claim alleging that a medical
device manufacturer violated a duty under federal
law to report adverse-event information to the Food and Drug Administration.
||Merck & Co. v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Company
||Whether the federal antitrust laws permit a brand-name manufacturer that holds the patent for a drug to enter into a settlement of patent litigation with a prospective generic manufacturer, where the settlement includes a payment from the brand manufacturer to the generic manufacturer but does not exclude competition beyond the scope of the patent.
||Minnesota v. Sahr
||Whether this Court should address an issue it reserved in Serfass v. United States and Sanabria v. United States, on whether “a defendant who is afforded an opportunity to obtain a determination of a legal defense prior to trial and nevertheless knowingly allows himself to be placed in jeopardy before raising the defense” forfeits or waives his double jeopardy protections.
||Missouri ex rel. KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations Co. v. Missouri Public Service Commission
||Whether the filed rate doctrine and
Supremacy Clause permit a state public service
commission to “trap” federally approved costs with a
utility by recognizing the prudency of obtaining
electric power from a plant in another state, but then
barring the utility from recovering the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission-approved
transmission costs of importing that power.
||Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355
||Whether intangible things can be “deliver[ed]” under Section 302(a)(2) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which makes it unlawful for employers “to pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to pay, lend, or deliver, any money or other thing of value . . . to any labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(2).
||Mutual First Federal Credit Union v. Charvat
||Whether Congress has the authority to confer
Article III standing to sue when the plaintiff suffers
no concrete harm and alleges as an injury only a
bare, technical violation of a federal statute.
||Ninestar Technology Co. v. Int'l Trade Commission
||Whether the initial authorized sale outside the United States of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.
||Nomura Home Equity Loan v. National Credit Union Administration Board
||Whether 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14), which sets the
“statute of limitations” for “contract” and “tort”
claims included in any action brought by the
National Credit Union Administration Board,
displaces the absolute three-year statute of repose
established by Congress in Section 13 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77m.
||Noriega v. Torres
||(1) Whether, under Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989), a police officer’s accidental, inadvertent use of deadly force against an arrestee can constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) whether, under Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the standard for unreasonable force under the Fourth Amendment is identical to the standard of general negligence so that an officer may be held liable for the accidental, inadvertent use of deadly force against an arrestee; and (3) whether a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity for the accidental, inadvertent use of deadly force against an arrestee.
||Northover v. Archuleta
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
erred by reversing the United
States Merit Systems Protection Board's (MSPB) interpretation of its enabling statute and extending Department of the Navy v. Egan, without Congressional authorization, to restrict the MSPB's statutory
scope of review in employee appeals arising from an
agency decision that does not involve a security clearance or access to classified information.
||O’Neill v. Al Rajhi Bank
||(1) Whether the civil remedy provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333, supports claims against defendants based on theories of secondary liability, and requires plaintiffs to establish that a defendant’s support provided to a terrorist organization was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injury; (2) whether U.S. courts have personal jurisdiction over defendants who, acting abroad, provide material support to a terrorist organization that attacks the territorial United States and the defendant intends to provide support to the organization, knows of the organization’s objective and history of attacking U.S. interests, and can foresee that its material support will be used in attacks on the United States.
||Office of Personnel Management v. Golinski
||Whether Section 3 of Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7, violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the same sex who are legally
married under the laws of their state.
||Office of Personnel Management v. Pedersen
||Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act violates the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the same sex who are legally married under the laws of their State.
||Oneok Inc. v. Learjet
||Whether the Natural Gas
Act, which occupies the field as to matters
within its scope, preempts state-law claims challenging industry
practices that directly affect the wholesale natural
gas market when those claims are asserted by litigants
who purchased gas in retail transactions.
||Patel v. Johnson
||(1) Whether the Board of Immigration Appeals is entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. when interpreting the definition of “national” codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22); and (2) whether the definition of “national” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) encompasses persons like petitioner who have undisputedly shown their “permanent allegiance to the United States,” id., including through the filing of an application for U.S. citizenship.
||Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Management
||Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), 1 U.S.C. § 7, violates the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as applied to legally married same-sex couples.
||Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.
||(1) Whether, in conflict with decisions of the
Third and Sixth Circuits, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation’s right to subrogation
is limited to customers’ Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) claims against a failed
brokerage’s estate and therefore does not reach
claims against third parties that share responsibility
for the brokerage’s collapse and customers’ losses;
(2) whether, in conflict with decisions of the
Fourth and Eighth Circuits, federal statutory silence
overrides any right to contribution under state law
for liabilities arising under the federal statute regardless of whether Congress intended to preempt
the state law; and (3) whether, in conflict with decisions of the First
and Seventh Circuits, a trustee lacks standing under
SIPA or the Bankruptcy Code to assert claims
against parties that hastened or deepened the bankruptcy
and are therefore general to all of an estate’s
customers or creditors.
||Public Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi v. IndyMac MBS
||Whether the filing of a putative class action serves,
under American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, to satisfy the three year
time limitation in § 13 of the Securities Act with
respect to the claims of putative class members.
||Quince v. Florida
||Whether the Supreme Court of Florida’s affirmation of the state post-conviction court’s ruling that Mr. Quince is not mentally retarded, and thus ineligible to be executed in violation of his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights, is in violation of this Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia.
||RBS Citizens, N.A. v. Ross
||(1) Whether it is consistent with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes to hold that a defendant to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) class action has no right to raise statutory afﬁrmative defenses on an individual basis if the classseeks “only” monetary relief; and (2) whether a district court can conclude that the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality requirement is satisﬁed when a class claims the denial of overtime pay, without resolving whether dissimilarities in the class would preclude it from establishing liability on a class-wide basis.
||Robinson v. Drummond
||Whether the Sixth Circuit
violated the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act by holding that “some form” of Waller v. Georgia's
specific four-part test was clearly established for
partial courtroom closures and that a state court
could unreasonably apply the modified test in the
||Romeike v. Holder
||(1) Whether prosecution under a generally applicable law may constitute persecution when such a law violates human rights treaty obligations concerning a protected ground; and (2) whether prosecution under a generally applicable law may constitute persecution when there is direct evidence that one central reason for the government’s motive for prosecution is the desire to suppress the applicant on a protected ground.
||Runyon v. U.S.
||(1) Whether, in order to demonstrate that evidentiary
errors in a capital sentencing proceeding were harmless,
the government must establish that the errors did not
affect the verdict of the jury that actually heard the case
or whether the government may instead meet its burden
by demonstrating that such errors would not have affected
a hypothetical, reasonable jury; and (2) whether, under the cumulative error doctrine, a
reviewing court must reverse if the government cannot
establish that preserved errors are harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, or is reversal required only if the errors
“so fatally infect[ed] the trial that they violated the trial’s
||Ryan v. Hurles
||Whether, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), state court adjudications are per se unreasonable and not entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) merely because the state court does not conduct an evidentiary hearing.
||Ryan v. James
||Whether the Ninth Circuit’s panel opinion conflicts with the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and this Court's decisions in Harrington v. Richter, and Cullen v. Pinholster insofar as it (a) treated AEDPA’s deferential standard as a waivable defense, rather than an inherent restriction on a federal court’s authority, (b) refused to find that the state post-conviction (PCR) court issued a merits ruling on respondent’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, when the state court expressly ruled that none of respondent’s PCR claims were colorable, and (c) considered evidence presented for the first time in federal court to grant habeas relief.
||Sanchez v. U.S.
||Whether, as the First Circuit alone has held, a lawsuit asserting claims arising out of federal employees’ conduct that is tortious is nevertheless implicitly exempt from the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), which provides that the United States may be sued and shall be liable for the torts of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment, because the conduct also violates a federal statute, regulation, or policy that does not itself authorize suits for damages.
||Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Butler
||(1) Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement for class action certification can be satisfied based solely on a determination that it would be “efficient” to decide a single common question at trial, without considering any of the individual issues that would also need to be tried, and without determining whether the aggregate of common issues predominates over the aggregate of individual issues; and (2) whether a class may be certified on breach of warranty claims where it is undisputed that most members did not experience the alleged product defect and where fact of injury would have to be litigated on a member-by-member basis.
||Sepulvado v. Jindal
||Whether and to what extent the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles a
condemned inmate to timely notice of the method by
which he will be executed.
||Strine v. Delaware Coalition For Open Government
||Whether Press-Enterprise Corp. v. Superior Court of California's “experience and logic” test requires
invalidation on First Amendment grounds of a Delaware
statute authorizing state judges to act as arbitrators
in business disputes — when the parties voluntarily
select arbitration — because the arbitration
proceedings are not open to the public.
||Strouth v. Colson
||(1) Whether this Court’s decision in Cullen v. Pinholster
(2011), permits an exception whereby federal courts may
consider newly developed evidence when the failure to develop that
evidence in state court is a consequence of constrained process that is
inadequate to develop the factual record; (2) whether this Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan
(2012), applies to substantial ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims that were not raised in state court because constrained state
court process prohibited development of the evidence that gives rise to
||Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado
||Whether New Mexico is in violation of the Rio Grande Compact and the Rio Grande Project Act, which apportion water to Rio Grande Project beneficiaries.
||Texas v. U.S.
||(1) Whether the district court erred and exacerbated the constitutional difficulties with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by requiring Texas to increase the number of majority-minority congressional districts in response to population growth, by treating “coalition” and “crossover” districts as protected under Section 5, and by applying a “functional” definition of retrogression that fails to give covered jurisdictions fair notice of the redistricting decisions that will be deemed to violate Section 5; (2) whether the district court erred and exacerbated the constitutional difficulties with Section 5 by finding a discriminatory purpose under the new permissive standard adopted by Congress in the 2006 reauthorization in attempting to abrogate this Court’s decision in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd.; (3) whether the district court erred and exacerbated the constitutional difficulties with Section 5 by allowing private intervenors to challenge the Texas Senate map, even though the Department of Justice conceded that this map was entitled to preclearance; and (4) whether the 2006 reauthorization of Section 5, as so construed, is constitutional, to the extent that the district court did not err in construing Section 5.