Petitions We’re Watching

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Petitions We're Watching
Docket Case Page Issue(s)
11-46 Adar v. Smith (1) Whether a state violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause when an executive official selectively disregards some out-of-state judgments of adoption based on policy assessments of the wisdom of those judgments; (2) whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy for a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause; and (3) whether a state violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when, based on its disapproval of the unmarried status of a child’s adoptive parents, the state refuses to issue the child with an accurate, amended birth certificate.
14-1 AEP Energy Services v. Heartland Regional Medical Center (1) Whether due process permits a court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over non-consenting, out-of-state defendants based on the plaintiffs’ bare allegation that the defendants engaged in a nationwide conspiracy outside the forum that had an intended effect inside the forum (as well as presumably in every other state); and (2) whether due process permits a court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over non-consenting, out-of-state defendants when the defendants’ limited forum conduct bears no causal relationship to the plaintiffs’ claim.
13-1467 Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Kobold Whether the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA), which expressly “preempt[s] any State or local law” that would prevent enforcement of “[t]he terms of any contract” under FEHBA that “relate to the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits (including payments with respect to benefits),” preempts state laws precluding carriers that administer FEHBA plans from seeking reimbursement or subrogation pursuant to the terms of FEHBA contracts.
12-550 Alpha I, LP v. U.S. 1) Whether the penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6662 for an overvaluation misstatement is applicable to any underpayment of tax that may result from adjustments made by the IRS in a notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (“FPAA”) issued to a partnership, when that partnership concedes the adjustments asserted in the FPAA on a ground that is separate from valuation. 2) Whether a court has jurisdiction in a partnership-level proceeding under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (“TEFRA”) (i.e., 26 U.S.C. §§ 6221—6233) to determine whether a partner’s transfer of his or her partnership interest was a sham, based on the possibility that the trial court might make findings not urged by either party but that would support the court’s jurisdiction.
11-363 Amgen Inc. v. New York (1) Whether a claim can be deemed “false or fraudulent” within the meaning of the False Claims Act because the claimant violated a statutory, regulatory or contractual obligation and, at the time the claim was submitted, the government payor could have but was not required to deny the claim on that ground; and (2) whether the provisions of the False Claims Act can be used to enforce compliance with statutes, regulations, contractual obligations, or other program requirements, even though no statute, regulation or contractual provision expressly conditions payment on compliance with those obligations.
14-5227 Arroyo v. U.S. (1) Whether this Court should resolve a circuit split concerning whether the mere touching (simple battery) of a law enforcement officer is a violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); (2) whether the offense of discharging a firearm from a vehicle, which does not require knowledge of another person’s presence, is a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); and (3) whether Almendarez-Torres v. United States should be overruled.
13-1379 Athena Cosmetics v. Allergan Whether, under Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act impliedly preempts a private state-law claim for unfair competition premised on a party’s purported failure to obtain Food and Drug Administration approval, where the Food and Drug Administration itself has not imposed any such requirement.
13-330 Avis Budget Group v. Alaska Rent-A-Car Whether the erroneous deprivation of a peremptory challenge in federal court, which allows a prospective juror who should have been stricken to sit on the jury, is subject to harmless-error review.
13-1421 Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett Whether, under Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that “[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void,” a chapter 7 debtor may “strip off” a junior mortgage lien in its entirety when the outstanding debt owed to a senior lienholder exceeds the current value of the collateral.
14-163 Bank of America, N.A. v. Toledo-Cardona Whether, under Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that “[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void,” a chapter 7 debtor may “strip off” a junior mortgage lien in its entirety when the outstanding debt owed to a senior lienholder exceeds the current value of the collateral.
12-13 Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives v. Gill (1) Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, violates the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; and (2) whether the court below erred by inventing and applying to Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act a previously unknown standard of equal protection review.
14-123 BP Exploration & Production Inc. v. Lake Eugenie Land & Development Whether the court of appeals erred in holding – in conflict with the Second, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits – that district courts can, consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and Article III of the Constitution, certify classes that include numerous members who have not suffered any injury caused by the defendant.
12-23 Brewer v. Diaz Whether the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ignored this Court’s precedent and erred in holding that Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) Section 38-651(O) (Section O) violates the Equal Protection Clause by limiting healthcare benefits to state employees’ spouses and dependents – and thus not extending such benefits to state employees’ domestic partners – given that a) Section O is facially neutral and there is no evidence that the Legislature intended to discriminate based on sexual orientation; b) Section O furthers the State’s interests in promoting marriage while also eliminating the additional expense and administrative burdens involved in providing healthcare benefits to state employees’ domestic partners; and c) the court’s reason for finding that Section O discriminates against gay and lesbian state employees was that Arizona prohibits same-sex marriage.
13-1433 Brumfield v. Cain (1) Whether a state court that considers the evidence presented at a petitioner's penalty phase proceeding as determinative of the petitioner's claim of mental retardation under Atkins v. Virginia has based its decision on an unreasonable determination of facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); and (2) whether a state court that denies funding to an indigent petitioner who has no other means of obtaining evidence of his mental retardation has denied petitioner his “opportunity to be heard,” contrary to Atkins and Ford v. Wainwright and his constitutional right to be provided with the “basic tools” for an adequate defense, contrary to Ake v. Oklahoma.
14-116 Bullard v. Hyde Park Savings Bank Whether an order denying confirmation of a bankruptcy plan is appealable.
11-1497 Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP (1) Whether the Federal Circuit departed from the standard this Court articulated in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing for “arising under” jurisdiction of the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. §1338, when it held that state law legal malpractice tort claims which involve no actual patents and have no impact on actual patent rights come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts because a patent was involved in the underlying litigation; and (2) whether the Federal Circuit’s overly broad and mistaken standard has caused a conflict among state courts and federal courts regarding federal jurisdiction with some other courts declining to assume federal jurisdiction of these state law tort cases.
12-6142 Calhoun v. U.S. (1) Whether it is fundamental or structural error not amenable to meaningful review for the government to resort to racial prejudice or stereotypes as an indicia of guilt; (2) If it is not structural error, is it always plain error for the government to interject racial stereotypes into a trial in order to show the defendant’s guilt?
13-439 CarMax Auto Superstores California, LLC v. Fowler Whether California’s “Gentry rule” – under which class-action waivers in employment arbitration agreements are invalid if “a class arbitration is likely to be a significantly more effective practical means of vindicating the rights of the affected employees than individual litigation or arbitration,” Gentry v. Superior Court of L.A. County, is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act in light of this Court’s decisions in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.
14-212 Carroll v. Carman (1) Whether, when a police officer approaches a residence to conduct a “knock and talk,” the Fourth Amendment requires the officer to go to the “front door” even where it reasonably appears that some other entrance is also customarily used by visitors; and (2) whether the court of appeals erred in holding that such a rule was “clearly established” for purposes of qualified immunity.
12-747 Cerdant v. DHL Express (USA) Is a class representative in a putative class action faced with a Rule 68 offer of judgment in excess of its potential recovery that makes no reference to class claims required to reject said offer, proceed to trial, and bear all of the costs of continuing litigation in order to preserve its right to appellate review of a denial of class certification?
12-747 Cerdant v. DHL Express (USA) Is a class representative in a putative class action faced with a Rule 68 offer of judgment in excess of its potential recovery that makes no reference to class claims required to reject said offer, proceed to trial, and bear all of the costs of continuing litigation in order to preserve its right to appellate review of a denial of class certification?
13-1044 Cisco Systems v. Commil USA, LLC Whether, and in what circumstances, the Seventh Amendment permits a court to order a partial retrial of induced patent infringement without also retrying the related question of patent invalidity. CVSG: 10/16/2014.
13-1412 City and County of San Francisco, California v. Sheehan (1) Whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act requires law enforcement officers to provide accommodations to an armed, violent, and mentally ill suspect in the course of bringing the suspect into custody; and (2) whether it was clearly established that even where an exception to the warrant requirement applied, an entry into a residence could be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment by reason of the anticipated resistance of an armed and violent suspect within.
14-56 City of Newport Beach, California v. Pacific Shores Properties, LLC Whether a disparate-treatment claim under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., that challenges a facially nondiscriminatory law on the ground that the law nevertheless intentionally discriminates on the basis of disability can prevail absent proof of discriminatory effects.
13-896 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems (1) Whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that a defendant's belief that a patent is invalid is a defense to induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b); and (2) whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. required retrial on the issue of intent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) where the jury (A) found the defendant had actual knowledge of the patent and (B) was instructed that “[i]nducing third-party infringement cannot occur unintentionally.” CVSG: 10/16/2014.
12-744 Convergent Outsourcing v. Zinni Does an offer to provide a plaintiff with all of the relief he has requested, including more than the legal amount of damages plus costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, fail to moot the underlying claim because the defendant has not also offered to agree to the entry of a judgment against it?
13-1305 Coventry Health Care of Missouri v. Nevils Whether the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA), which governs the federal government’s provision of health benefits to millions of federal employees and their dependents, preempts state laws precluding carriers that administer FEHBA plans from seeking subrogation as required by their contracts with the Office of Personnel Management.
13-1227 Crews v. Farina Whether a habeas court may evade the highly deferential standard of review in the habeas statute by characterizing its legal and policy differences with the state court as unreasonable factual determinations and grant the writ on the basis of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel when the state court held that the cross-examination of the mitigation witness was not fundamental error under state law.
14-110 Dean Foods Company v. Food Lion, LLC Whether, in antitrust or other cases in which the plaintiff must prove causation in fact as an element of the claim, a plaintiff must produce evidence of causation to defeat a motion for summary judgment, or whether a court may instead presume causation at summary judgment and permit the case to proceed to trial based on that presumption.
12-15 Department of Health and Human Services v. Massachusetts Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7, violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the same sex who are legally married under the laws of their state.
12-6230 Deyton v. Keller (1) For purposes of federal habeas review, has the U.S. Supreme Court clearly established the rule that due process prohibits a state court judge from taking into account his own religious beliefs in sentencing a defendant? (2) Did the state court judge violate petitioners’ due process rights when the judge told petitioners, following their guilty plea to the robbery at a church, that they had stolen God’s money intended for the establishment of a religious kingdom on earth and then sentenced each of them to 53 to 71 years? (3) Did the sentences of petitioners, who were adolescents without any serious prior record and did not harm anyone in the robbery, violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment?
14-71 Diacetyl Plaintiffs v. Aaroma Holdings, LLC (1) Whether the Third Circuit erred in concluding, contrary to the decisions of this Court and the law in the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, that a trustee in bankruptcy can settle the tort claims of those injured by a company that filed for bankruptcy when the debtor company could neither bring the claim at the commencement of the bankruptcy nor was injured in any way by the underlying allegations; and (2) whether the Third Circuit erred in concluding, contrary to the law in the First, Ninth, and Federal Circuits, that a claim is general and belongs to the estate simply because other claimants could take advantage of a finding of successor liability, rather than finding it is specific and can go forward because it is unique to these plaintiffs.
13-1496 Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians Whether Indian tribal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate civil tort claims against nonmembers, including as a means of regulating the conduct of nonmembers who enter into consensual relationships with a tribe or its members.
12-1056 Dunn v. U.S. (1) Whether a conspiracy charge under 18 U.S.C. § 371 which alleges violations of both the defraud and offense prongs of that statute presents one or two offenses; (2) whether an ends-of-justice finding necessary to grant an excludable continuance under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7), can be inferred based solely on the context in which the district court granted a continuance rather than the court’s reasoning “on the record" and (3) whether a sentencing court violates the Ex Post Facto Clause by using the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, rather than the Guidelines in effect at the time of the offense, when the newer Guidelines create a significant risk that a defendant will receive a higher sentence.
13-852 Federal National Mortgage Association v. Sundquist Whether a state can restrict a national bank’s exercise of its fiduciary powers in connection with real property in that state if the bank is authorized to act as a fiduciary by the Comptroller of the Currency and not prohibited from doing so by the (different) state in which the bank is “located” under 12 U.S.C. § 92a and 12 C.F.R. § 9.7. CVSG: 10/07/2014.
12-1076 Fleming v. Moswin (1) Whether plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial when defendants' race-neutral explanation for their peremptory challenge of a black venireperson was not supported by the record; and (2) whether the preliminary issue of plaintiffs having established a prima facie showing is moot.
22o142 Florida v. Georgia Whether Florida is entitled to equitable apportionment of the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin and appropriate injunctive relief against Georgia to sustain an adequate flow of fresh water into the Apalachicola Region. CVSG: 09/18/2014.
13-1505 Freidus v. ING Groep N.V. Whether, for purposes of a claim under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, a plaintiff must plead that a statement of opinion not only contains false statements of material facts or omits material facts required to make the statements in the registration statement not misleading, but also that the speaker actually knew that the statements were false or misleading, even though the Court has held, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, that under § 11 “the issuer of the securities is held absolutely liable,” without regard to fault.
12-10591 Fugit v. U.S. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), one may not entice a minor “to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense.” Does the “sexual activity” element require the defendant to make or attempt physical contact with a minor, as the Seventh Circuit holds, or may a single Internet chat and phone call with no attempted physical contact with a minor satisfy the element, so long as the defendant caller was involved in the “active pursuit of [his own] libidinal gratification,” as the Fourth Circuit holds.
13-5769 Fulmer v. Texas (1) Texas has enacted a statute, Texas Penal Code § 21.02, which criminalizes continuous sexual abuse of a child or children under age 14. A jury is permitted to convict someone without unanimously agreeing exactly which two acts occurred. All the jury has to unanimously decide is that any two acts (24 total acts if there are 12 jurors) occurred over a period lasting 30 days or more. Does this statute violate the federal constitutional requirements of a unanimous jury verdict in criminal prosecutions or due process of law? Or is the statute constitutional because, as the Texas appellate courts have held, the “two or more acts” element is only the “manner and means” of committing this offense, and therefore the jury does not need to unanimously agree which two acts occurred in order to convict; (2) Texas Government Code § 508.145(a) prohibits someone convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child or children under age 14 from being parole eligible. However, someone convicted of a multiple, specific acts of abuse against a child or children under age 14 remains parole eligible. Does this legislative classification violate the federal constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws, especially when, as here, a defendant is convicted of both continuous sexual abuse, which is not parole eligible, and specific acts of abuse, which are parole eligible.
12-7516 Gallow v. Cooper Whether a federal court can consider new evidence to support a state prisoner’s application for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), when the state court record was not developed as a result of incompetent and likely conflicted post-conviction counsel.
13-97 Geneva-Roth Ventures v. Kelker Whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts Montana’s rule subjecting arbitration provisions in standard-form contracts to a heightened standard of consent that does not apply to other terms in form contracts.
14-95 Glebe v. Frost Whether Herring v. New York clearly establishes that a limitation on closing argument is structural error, as the Ninth Circuit held here, or, whether, as many other courts have held, Herring allows the possibility that such a limitation is subject to harmless error review.
13-6646 Gomez v. Stephens (1) Whether, under the Antiterrorism and Death Penalty Act of 1996, a Franks v. Delaware hearing is a "critical stage of the criminal proceedings" as envisioned in United States v. Cronic, where petitioner's attorney's presence is required by the Sixth Amendment; (2) whether the court of appeals erred when it held that petitioner's right to his attorney's presence at a Franks hearing was not violated when the state trial court held such a hearing; (3) whether petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross examine his accusers was violated by the absence of his attorney at his Franks hearing; (4) whether petitioner's attorney's absence from his Franks hearing was a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver by petitioner as required by Johnson v. Zerbst; and (5) whether a conflict of interest arose and existed due to petitioner's attorney's absence and therefore lack of representation at the Franks hearing.
13-1416 Gordon v. Bank of America, N.A. Whether an order denying confirmation of a bankruptcy plan is appealable.
12-804 Grounds v. Sessoms (1) Whether, when the suspect in custody makes an ambiguous or equivocal reference to counsel before receiving Miranda warnings, “clearly established Federal law” as determined by this Court forbids the police from advising the suspect of his Miranda rights and then conducting an interrogation after he waives them; and (2) whether, under the “highly deferential” standard of review set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), it was objectively unreasonable for the state court to conclude that respondent did not unambiguously and unequivocally invoke his right to counsel before receiving Miranda warnings.
12-691 Hammond v. Sheets (1) Whether the federal courts below correctly decided to exclude Petitioner’s evidence provided in support of the factual basis of his claim that ineffective assistance of counsel violated his Sixth Amendment rights during his state trial; (2) whether Ohio law operated to establish a right to assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, as well as a right to effective assistance of counsel through the Sixth Amendment, or whether it operates to excuse procedural defaults bringing a substantive claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in an initial-review collateral proceeding where there was either no counsel or ineffective counsel; (3) whether the federal courts below correctly decided that sufficient evidence supports Petitioner’s conviction for rape as required by due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
13-1512 Hammond v. U.S. (1) Whether and under what circumstances the Eighth Amendment authorizes a district court to impose a sentence less than the statutory mandatory minimum; and (2) whether a criminal defendant's waiver of appeal rights made in an agreement to resolve a case prohibits an appeal by the government.
14-93 HealthBridge Management, LLC v. Kreisberg (1) Whether a companion authorization issued by the general counsel of the National Labor Relations Board in conjunction with an order from the Board itself, purporting to possess a quorum and take the same action on its own behalf, suffices to authorize a section 10(j) proceeding commenced while the Board itself lacked a quorum to authorize it; and (2) whether the familiar four-factor test for preliminary injunctive relief articulated in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. applies to preliminary injunctive relief sought in a petition under section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act, as a majority of circuits have held, or whether an entirely different and profoundly deferential standard applies, as the courts below held.
13-256 Hegab v. Long Whether a Federal District Court may review a decision of a federal agency revoking the security clearance of an employee where the employee has made a colorable claim that the decision revoking his clearance was in violation of his rights under the First, Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
13-603 Hoffner v. Walker Whether the Michigan Court of Appeals’ prejudice ruling under Strickland v. Washington rested on “an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement” so as to justify habeas relief. Metrish v. Lancaster (quoting Harrington v. Richter).
13-5086 Howell v. Tennessee (1) Whether, in proceedings under Atkins v. Virginia , the Sixth Amendment requires a state to prove the absence of mental retardation (intellectual disability) beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, because death is not within the permissible range of sentences for a person who is intellectually disabled; (2) whether this Court should grant certiorari, vacate, and remand for further consideration of Howell's Sixth Amendment claim in light of Alleyne v. United States ; (3) whether it violates the Eighth Amendment and Atkins for a state court to determine a petitioner's I.Q. without appropriately applying scientifically reliable standards for the assessment of intellectual functioning such as the Standard Error Of Measurement (SEM) of I. Q. tests or the "Flynn Effect," a recognized phenomenon requiring the downward adjustment of raw I.Q. scores to reflect the petitioner's actual I.Q.; (4) whether the Eighth Amendment and Atkins allow a state to use standards for assessing adaptive deficits that contravene scientifically accepted clinical practice and that focus on an individual's abilities rather than his actual deficits, when such deficits satisfy clinical standards for intellectual disability; and (5) whether it violates due process and/or equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment for a state supreme court to require consideration of SEM and the Flynn Effect in some Atkins cases but to refuse their consideration to the petitioner.
14-165 Hoyle v. U.S. Whether, when the Federal Sentencing Guidelines calculate a person's offense level based on prior convictions that are expressly excluded under the relevant federal statute, the statute or the Guidelines control.
14-209 Illinois v. Cummings Whether the Fourth Amendment permits a police officer to request a driver to produce his license during a lawfully-initiated traffic stop but after reasonable suspicion or probable cause has dissipated, where the officer's conduct is reasonable under the totality of circumstances and the stop is not unreasonably prolonged.
14-197 Illinois v. Davis Whether Miller v. Alabama -- which held that a state may not sentence a juvenile homicide offender to life imprisonment without parole without first providing a process for the sentencer to consider the offender's youth and attendant characteristics -- announced a new substantive rule which applies retroactively to a conviction that was final before Miller was decided.
13-499 In re sealed case Whether a motion for return of property pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) is "solely for return of property," underDiBella v. United States, such that a denial of that motion would be final and immediately appealable where the motion seeks return of property and does not also seek suppression of evidence at a subsequent hearing or trial; and (2) Whether the Perlman doctrine, which provides for interlocutory appeals of non-final decisions applies to motions for return of property filed under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g).
12-683 James v. Federal Election Commission When appellant wishes to take funds that may be legally contributed to political action committees and party committees, and instead contribute those same funds directly to additional candidate committees, whether the three-judge district court erred in dismissing her facial and as-applied challenge to Section 307(b) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3)(A), which imposes a limit of $37,500 on total contributions to all individual candidates.
13-1318 Johnson v. City of Shelby (1) Whether a federal complaint is subject to dismissal when it fails to cite the statute authorizing the cause of action; (2) whether the lower federal courts have authority to create pleading requirements for complaints when those requirements are not contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and (3) whether a federal complaint should be dismissed when it alleges the elements of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, but does not cite 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
13-1516 Kalamazoo County Road Commission v. Deleon Whether it is an “adverse employment action” for a discrimination claim, or a “materially adverse action” for a retaliation claim, when an employer grants an employee's request for a job transfer.
13-52 Kansas v. Swindler (1) Whether, when law enforcement officers provide Miranda v. Arizona warnings prior to conducting a voluntary, noncustodial interview, they must cease all questioning if the interview subject subsequently expresses a desire to stop the interview, or whether the officers may continue the questioning without violating any constitutional requirements; and (2) whether, if what concededly began as a voluntary, noncustodial interview by police arguably becomes a custodial situation, the fact of “custody” alone makes any subsequently obtained confession involuntary, or must a court employ a “totality of the circumstances” analysis, with custody simply being one factor.
13-1241 KBR, Incorporated v. Metzgar (1) Whether the political question doctrine bars state-law tort claims against a battlefield support contractor operating in an active war zone when adjudication of those claims would necessarily require examining sensitive military judgments; (2) whether the Federal Tort Claim Act's “combatant-activities exception,” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j), preempts state-law tort claims against a battlefield support contractor that arise out of the U.S. military's combatant activities in a theater of combat; and (3) whether the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity bars state-law tort claims against a private contractor performing delegated public functions where the government would be immune from suit if it performed the same functions.
13-705 Keiran v. Home Capital Whether, to exercise the right to rescind a mortgage loan under the Truth in Lending Act, it is sufficient for a consumer to notify the creditor in writing within three years of obtaining the loan (as the Third and Fourth Circuits have held, and as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has concluded), or whether the consumer must also file suit within that three-year period (as the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held).
13-817 Kellogg Brown & Root Services v. Harris (1) Whether the political question doctrine bars state-law tort claims against a battlefield support contractor operating in an active war zone when adjudication of those claims would necessarily require examining sensitive military judgments; (2) whether the Federal Tort Claims Act's “combatant-activities exception,” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j), preempts state-law tort claims against a battlefield support contractor that arise out of the U.S. military's combatant activities in a theater of combat.
12-140 Kentucky v. King (1) Whether the hot pursuit exception to the warrant requirement is contingent on a subjective determination of pursuit; and (2) what constitutes a serious offense for purposes of dispensing with the warrant requirement; and what test or tests is proper to determine when warrantless entry is permissible.
11-418 Khaburzania v. New York Whether this Court's mandate that by virtue of the Constitution, counsel must advise their clients of the immigration consequences of a criminal plea is applicable retroactively.
13-720 Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises Whether this Court should overrule Brulotte v. Thys Co., which held that “a patentee’s use of a royalty agreement that projects beyond the expiration date of the patent is unlawful per se.”
14-114 King v. Burwell Whether the Internal Revenue Service may permissibly promulgate regulations to extend tax-credit subsidies to coverage purchased through Exchanges established by the federal government under section 1321 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
14-77 Kolon Industries, Incorporated v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Company Whether, under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b), the federal recusal statute, a federal judge is relieved of his mandatory statutory duty of self-disqualification simply because neither party filed a timely motion to disqualify the judge.
12-150 Kwong v. Holder (1) Whether an abstract of judgment, which is prepared by a court clerk for sentencing purposes after a defendant’s guilty plea and without the defendant’s input, qualifies as a conclusive record made or used in adjudicating guilt sufficient to determine the nature of a prior conviction under Shepard v. United States; and (2) whether a burglary conviction in a state that does not require an unlawful or unprivileged entry can be considered a crime of violence under Leocal v. Ashcroft, when it is not a violent felony under Taylor v. United States.
11-438 Liberty University v. Geithner (1) Whether the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) bars courts from deciding the limits of federal power to enact a novel and unprecedented law that forces individuals into the stream of commerce and coerces employers to reorder their business to enter into a government-mandated and heavily regulated health insurance program when the challenged mandates are penalties, not taxes, where the government argues Congress never intended the AIA to apply, and where the petitioners are currently being forced to comply with various parts of the law and thus have no other alternative remedy but the present action; (2) whether Congress exceeded its enumerated powers by enacting a novel and unprecedented law that forces individuals who otherwise are not market participants to enter the stream of commerce and purchase a comprehensive but vaguely defined and burdensome health insurance product, and if so, to what extent can this essential part of the statutory scheme be severed; and (3) whether Congress exceeded its enumerated powers by enacting a novel and unprecedented law that forces private employers into the health insurance market and requires them to enter into third-party contracts to provide a comprehensive but a vaguely defined health insurance product to their employees and extended beneficiaries, and if so, to what extent can this essential part of the statutory scheme be severed.
11-1536 Lucas v. U.S. Whether the sentencing terms of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) (i)-(iii) constitute escalating, fixed sentences, or instead mere minimum sentences with implicit maximums of life in prison.
11-9843 Lyons v. Mitchell Whether a habeas petitioner’s Federal constitutional claim of denial of due process in the admission against him of gruesome photographic evidence has been “adjudicated on the merits” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) where the State court decision affirming the trial judge’s admission of such evidence in the exercise of her discretion never addressed the petitioner’s claim of denial of Federal due process in its admission.
12-604 Madison County v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York Whether the 300,000-acre ancient Oneida reservation in New York still exists, neither disestablished nor diminished, despite (1) the federal government’s actions taken in furtherance of disestablishment (including, but not limited to, the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek); (2) this Court’s holding in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York that the Oneida Indian Nation of New York cannot exercise sovereignty over lands it purchases in the ancient reservation area; and (3) this Court’s finding in that case that land in the ancient reservation area has not been treated as an Indian reservation by the federal, state or local governments for nearly two centuries.
13-697 Madrigal-Barcenas v. Holder Whether the plain text of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which states that a noncitizen is ineligible for cancellation of removal if he has been convicted of an offense “relating to a controlled substance," requires that a drug paraphernalia conviction involve or relate to a controlled substance that is actually listed in the federal schedules of controlled substances in order to render a noncitizen ineligible for cancellation of removal.
12-1453 Mariner’s Cove Townhomes Association v. U.S. Whether, as the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits and numerous state supreme courts have held, “the right to collect assessments, or real covenants generally,” constitute compensable property under the Takings Clause or whether, as the Fifth and D.C. Circuits and a smaller group of state supreme courts have held, they constitute noncompensable property.
12-6355 Marrero v. U.S. (1) Whether this court should grant certiorari to resolve the circuit split regarding what a sentencing court can consider when applying the modified categorical Approach? Specifically, some courts of appeals have held that sentencing courts can consider charging documents and plea colloquies only to determine which crime the defendant committed when his prior offense Occurred. Others have held that sentencing courts can also consider those documents to determine how the defendant committed the prior offense and (2) whether after the Supreme Court’s decision in Begay v. United States, the question of whether a crime is a crime of violence depends upon whether the elements require Conduct which is “violent, purposeful, and aggressive.” Should the analysis of Begay apply, even if an offense is enumerated in application note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 4b1.2, the definition section of the career offender guidelines?
13-8837 Martinez v. U.S. (1) Whether the First Amendment protects political speech that is uttered without the subjective or specific intent to threaten or intimidate; or, in the alternative, (2) whether 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which makes it a federal offense to “transmit[] in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing . . . any threat to injure the person of another,” is facially overbroad.
12-97 Massachusetts v. Dept. of Health and Human Services (1) Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7, violates the Tenth Amendment; and (2) whether Section 3 of DOMA violates the Spending Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
12-565 McCormick v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (1) Whether assets which a Medicaid recipient divested during her lifetime fall within that individual’s “estate” as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4); and (2) if not, whether 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) preempts Idaho statutes and regulations that authorize the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare to assert Medicaid recovery claims against assets in which the Medicaid recipient did not have any legal title to or interest in at the time of the recipient’s death.
12-245 Merck & Co. v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Company Whether the federal antitrust laws permit a brand-name manufacturer that holds the patent for a drug to enter into a settlement of patent litigation with a prospective generic manufacturer, where the settlement includes a payment from the brand manufacturer to the generic manufacturer but does not exclude competition beyond the scope of the patent.
12-239 Minnesota v. Sahr Whether this Court should address an issue it reserved in Serfass v. United States and Sanabria v. United States, on whether “a defendant who is afforded an opportunity to obtain a determination of a legal defense prior to trial and nevertheless knowingly allows himself to be placed in jeopardy before raising the defense” forfeits or waives his double jeopardy protections.
12-312 Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355 Whether intangible things can be “deliver[ed]” under Section 302(a)(2) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which makes it unlawful for employers “to pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to pay, lend, or deliver, any money or other thing of value . . . to any labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(2).
14-200 NACS, fka National Association of Convenience Stores v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Whether the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System’s regulation establishing a maximum allowable debit card interchange fee, 12 C.F.R. § 235.3, unlawfully permits banks to recover costs forbidden by the governing statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(4)(B).
12-552 Ninestar Technology Co. v. Int'l Trade Commission Whether the initial authorized sale outside the United States of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.
11-567 Noriega v. Torres (1) Whether, under Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989), a police officer’s accidental, inadvertent use of deadly force against an arrestee can constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) whether, under Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the standard for unreasonable force under the Fourth Amendment is identical to the standard of general negligence so that an officer may be held liable for the accidental, inadvertent use of deadly force against an arrestee; and (3) whether a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity for the accidental, inadvertent use of deadly force against an arrestee.
13-1067 OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs (1) Whether, for purposes of determining when an entity is an “agent” of a “foreign state” under the first clause of the commercial activity exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), the express definition of “agency” in the FSIA, the factors set forth in First National City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, or common law principles of agency, control; and (2) whether, under the first clause of the commercial activity exception of the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), a tort claim for personal injuries suffered in connection with travel outside of the United States is “based upon” the allegedly tortious conduct occurring outside of the United States or the preceding sale of the ticket in the United States for the travel entirely outside the United States.
12-16 Office of Personnel Management v. Golinski Whether Section 3 of Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7, violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the same sex who are legally married under the laws of their state.
12-302 Office of Personnel Management v. Pedersen Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the same sex who are legally married under the laws of their State.
13-606 Patel v. Johnson (1) Whether the Board of Immigration Appeals is entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. when interpreting the definition of “national” codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22); and (2) whether the definition of “national” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) encompasses persons like petitioner who have undisputedly shown their “permanent allegiance to the United States,” id., including through the filing of an application for U.S. citizenship.
12-231 Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Management Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), 1 U.S.C. § 7, violates the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as applied to legally married same-sex couples.
13-1504 Pregnancy Care Center of New York v. City of New York (1) Whether compelling a noncommercial pro-life speaker to declare it lacks a medical license passes strict scrutiny; and (2) whether a compelled speech law is unconstitutionally vague if the city can deem speakers as needing to comply, because of their “appearance,” without any ability for the speaker to know whether it must comply.
13-1162 Purdue Pharma L.P. v. U.S. ex rel. May (1) Whether the False Claims Act’s pre-2010 “public-disclosure bar,” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2009), prohibits claims that are “substantially similar” to prior public disclosures, or instead bars a claim only if the plaintiff’s knowledge “actually derives” from prior disclosures; (2) whether the False Claims Act’s “first-to-file” bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5), precludes a later-filed action that is based on the same facts as an earlier-filed action only so long as the earlier case is still pending; and (3) whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3287, suspends the limitations period for civil claims, such as a False Claims Act claim brought by a private party.
12-165 RBS Citizens, N.A. v. Ross (1) Whether it is consistent with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes to hold that a defendant to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) class action has no right to raise statutory affirmative defenses on an individual basis if the classseeks “only” monetary relief; and (2) whether a district court can conclude that the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality requirement is satisfied when a class claims the denial of overtime pay, without resolving whether dissimilarities in the class would preclude it from establishing liability on a class-wide basis.
13-1547 Ridley School District v. M. R., as Parents of E. R., a Minor Whether operation of a “stay-put” provision in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) – which requires that a child whose educational program under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act is under dispute to remain in his or her then-current placement while statutory “proceedings” to resolve the dispute are pending – terminates upon entry of a final judgment by a state or federal trial court in favor of the school district, as the D.C. and Sixth Circuits have held, or whether it continues until completion of any subsequent appeal of that judgment, as the Third and Ninth Circuits have held.
14-220 Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Baton Rouge v. Mayeux Whether a court can pivot liability for a priest's failure to report certain communications to public authorities on the court's own determination of whether those communications constitute “confession per se,” or whether it must respect the church's own view that such communications are confessional and absolutely protected from disclosure by the priest on penalty of automatic excommunication.
13-471 Romeike v. Holder (1) Whether prosecution under a generally applicable law may constitute persecution when such a law violates human rights treaty obligations concerning a protected ground; and (2) whether prosecution under a generally applicable law may constitute persecution when there is direct evidence that one central reason for the government’s motive for prosecution is the desire to suppress the applicant on a protected ground.
14-191 Ryan v. Hurles (1) Whether, under this Court's decision in Martinez v. Ryan, post-conviction counsel's ineffectiveness can provide cause to excuse the procedural default of an ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim, or whether Martinez v. Ryan is limited to excusing only the default of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (2) whether, under the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a state-court adjudication of a judicial-bias claim is per se unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) merely because the allegedly biased judge rules on the claim based on facts within her knowledge without first conducting an evidentiary hearing, or whether a federal court must grant AEDPA deference to the judge's determination when the evidence in the state-court record supports it.
13-1361 Samantar v. Yousef Whether a foreign official’s common-law immunity for acts performed on behalf of a foreign state is abrogated by plaintiffs’ allegations that those official acts violate jus cogens norms of international law.
12-335 Sanchez v. U.S. Whether, as the First Circuit alone has held, a lawsuit asserting claims arising out of federal employees’ conduct that is tortious is nevertheless implicitly exempt from the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), which provides that the United States may be sued and shall be liable for the torts of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment, because the conduct also violates a federal statute, regulation, or policy that does not itself authorize suits for damages.
14-59 Schultz v. Wescom (1) Whether the Ninth Circuit erred when it held - in conflict with the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, but in accord with the Seventh Circuit - that a district court's order striking or refusing to consider a qualified immunity motion is not subject to interlocutory appeal, even when it subjects a public official to unlimited discovery for the duration of a lawsuit; and (2) whether petitioners are entitled to qualified immunity.
12-1067 Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Butler (1) Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement for class action certification can be satisfied based solely on a determination that it would be “efficient” to decide a single common question at trial, without considering any of the individual issues that would also need to be tried, and without determining whether the aggregate of common issues predominates over the aggregate of individual issues; and (2) whether a class may be certified on breach of warranty claims where it is undisputed that most members did not experience the alleged product defect and where fact of injury would have to be litigated on a member-by-member basis.
14-152 Sexton v. Panel Processing Whether section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1140, prohibits retaliation against an employee who makes unsolicited complaints to management regarding possible ERISA violations.
13-1339 Spokeo v. Robins Whether Congress may confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare violation of a federal statute.
12-7720 Strouth v. Colson (1) Whether this Court’s decision in Cullen v. Pinholster (2011), permits an exception whereby federal courts may consider newly developed evidence when the failure to develop that evidence in state court is a consequence of constrained process that is inadequate to develop the factual record; (2) whether this Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan (2012), applies to substantial ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims that were not raised in state court because constrained state court process prohibited development of the evidence that gives rise to the claim?
13-884 Takushi v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP Whether, pursuant to Section 1635(f) of Title 15 of the U.S. Code, a borrower seeking to rescind a mortgage loan based upon Truth in Lending Act violations must bring suit within three years of loan consummation; and (2) if so, whether such a restrictive interpretation of Section 1635(f) of Title 15 should be limited to prospective application only as a new rule, since most borrowers and their attorneys otherwise relied to their detriment upon a contrary interpretation of the relevant language contained in this Court's 1998 decision in Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank.
14-19 Teo v. Securities and Exchange Commission Whether a court in a Securities and Exchange Commission civil enforcement action can order defendants to disgorge profits that were not attributable to their violations of the securities laws but were instead earned as a result of an intervening event unrelated to those violations.
13-956 Teva Pharmaceuticals USA v. Superior Court of California, Orange County Whether the California Court of Appeal erred when it deepened an acknowledged circuit split and held—contrary to this Court's decisions in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee and PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing; the decisions of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in Morris v. PLIVA, Inc. and Guarino v. Wyeth, LLC; and the plain language of the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”)—that federal law does not preempt state tort claims predicated on allegations that a generic drug manufacturer violated the FDCA by failing to immediately implement or otherwise disseminate notice of labeling changes that the United States Food and Drug Administration had approved for use on a generic drug product's brand-name equivalent.
22o141 Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado Whether New Mexico is in violation of the Rio Grande Compact and the Rio Grande Project Act, which apportion water to Rio Grande Project beneficiaries.
12-496 Texas v. U.S. (1) Whether the district court erred and exacerbated the constitutional difficulties with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by requiring Texas to increase the number of majority-minority congressional districts in response to population growth, by treating “coalition” and “crossover” districts as protected under Section 5, and by applying a “functional” definition of retrogression that fails to give covered jurisdictions fair notice of the redistricting decisions that will be deemed to violate Section 5; (2) whether the district court erred and exacerbated the constitutional difficulties with Section 5 by finding a discriminatory purpose under the new permissive standard adopted by Congress in the 2006 reauthorization in attempting to abrogate this Court’s decision in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd.; (3) whether the district court erred and exacerbated the constitutional difficulties with Section 5 by allowing private intervenors to challenge the Texas Senate map, even though the Department of Justice conceded that this map was entitled to preclearance; and (4) whether the 2006 reauthorization of Section 5, as so construed, is constitutional, to the extent that the district court did not err in construing Section 5.
13-1520 The Episcopal Church v. The Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth (1) Whether the First Amendment or Jones v. Wolf requires courts to enforce express trusts recited in general-church governing documents (as some jurisdictions hold), or whether such a trust is enforceable only when it would otherwise comply with state law (as others hold); (2) whether retroactive application of the neutral-principles approach infringes free-exercise rights; and (3) whether the neutral-principles approach endorsed in Jones remains a constitutionally viable means of resolving church-property disputes, especially in light of Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC.
11-117 Thomas More Law Center v. Obama (1) Whether Congress acted within its constitutional powers in passing the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act; and (2) whether the individual mandate provision of the Act is unconstitutional as applied to the individual petitioners who lack health insurance.
13-55 Toll Bros. v. Noohi Whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts a state-law rule invalidating arbitration provisions, but not contracts more generally, that lack mutuality of obligation.
13-343 U.S. v. Nevada Partners Fund, LLC Whether the overstatement penalty in Section 6662 of the Internal Revenue Code applies to an underpayment of tax resulting from a determination that a transaction lacks economic substance because the sole purpose of the transaction was to generate a tax loss by artificially inflating the adjusted basis of property.
12-265 Upsher-Smith Laboratories v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Company Whether the Third Circuit erred by holding, contrary to the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits, that an agreement settling patent litigation that does not restrict competition outside the scope of the exclusionary right granted by the patent itself may presumptively violate the antitrust laws.
12-968 Uribe v. Johnson Whether Lafler v. Cooper and habeas corpus principles require certainty about the effect of a violation of the right of effective counsel during plea negotiations before granting relief less drastic than vacating the guilty plea.
14-47 Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency Whether, under a statutory directive to regulate residual public health risks from electric utility steam generating units (EGUs) hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) emissions only as “appropriate and necessary,” the Administrator (i) may regulate EGU HAP emissions that pose no hazard to public health, and (ii) may (or must as a Chevron Step One matter) ignore costs in determining “appropriate” regulation because more narrowly drawn decisional standards in the same statute require (or preclude) the Administrator from considering costs.
11-420 Virginia v. Sebelius (1) Whether the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit erred when it became the first circuit to deny that a state of the Union has standing to defend its own code of laws; (2) whether the Fourth Circuit erred, and opened a circuit split, when it construed the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act contrary to the construction placed upon it by the chief law officer of the Commonwealth of Virginia by holding it to be merely symbolic and therefore not a real law capable of giving rise to a sovereign injury; (3) whether the Fourth Circuit erred when it read the political question doctrine prong of Massachusetts v. Mellon as having continued vitality so as to prevent a state from challenging an enactment of the United States on enumerated powers grounds; and (4) whether the power claimed by Congress in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) to mandate that a citizen purchase a good or service from another citizen is unconstitutional because the claimed power exceeds the outer limits of the Commerce Clause even as executed by the Necessary and Proper Clause.
14-144 Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans (1) Whether the messages and images that appear on state-issued specialty license plates qualify as government speech immune from any requirement of viewpoint neutrality; and (2) whether Texas engaged in “viewpoint discrimination” by rejecting the license-plate design proposed by the Sons of Confederate Veterans, when Texas has not issued any license plate that portrays the confederacy or the confederate battle flag in a negative or critical light.
12-322 Whirlpool Corp. v. Glazer (1) Whether a class may be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) even though most class members have not been harmed and could not sue on their own behalf; (2) whether a class may be certified without resolving factual disputes that bear directly on the requirements of Rule 23; and (3) whether a class may be certified without determining whether factual dissimilarities among putative class members give rise to individualized issues that predominate over any common issues.
14-29 Whitman v. U.S. (1) Whether, in a prosecution for insider trading under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), the relevant inside information must have been a “significant factor” in the defendant's decision to buy or sell, or whether -- as the court below held -- mere “knowing possession” of inside information suffices for a criminal conviction; (2) whether, in a prosecution for insider trading under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), the “fiduciary duty” element must be proved under well-established principles of state law, or whether -- as the court below held -- courts may define and impose the applicable fiduciary duty as a matter of federal common law; and (3) whether exculpatory testimony given by a witness during a deposition in a closely related federal enforcement proceeding is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) in a subsequent criminal trial when the witness is unavailable, or whether -- as the court below held -- such testimony may be excluded merely because it was given in a civil rather than criminal proceeding.
12-6988 Womack v. U.S. Whether petitioner was erroneously denied his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to present his defensive theory of lack of specific intent or mens rea.
11-740 Zurn Pex v. Cox When a party proffers expert testimony in support of or in opposition to a motion for class certification, may the district court rely on the testimony in ruling on the motion without conducting a full and conclusive examination of its admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and this Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ?
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