(1) Whether, in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action brought by an individual alleging that a prior criminal conviction was obtained in violation of this Court's decision in Brady v. Maryland – requiring the prosecution to turn over potentially exculpatory evidence – the statute of limitations runs from the time the case is resolved via nolle prosequi or otherwise “in such manner that [proceedings] cannot be revived” – as the Fourth Circuit below concluded – or runs from the moment the plaintiff may bring the action under this Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey – as the Tenth Circuit has concluded and as the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have suggested; and (2) whether the Fourth Circuit erred when it concluded, inconsistent with its own decisions and those of this Court, that individual police officers had an independent Brady duty to bring forward exculpatory evidence in 1988 and that this was clearly established so as to support a cause of action against the individual officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and negate a defense of qualified immunity.
(1) Whether it is error to deny a habeas petitioner a certificate of appealability in a case in which the state supreme court was divided and another federal court of appeals would recognize his claim; and (2) whether the fact that the prosecutor did not expand the sentence to which the defendant was exposed prohibits a finding of prosecutorial vindictiveness.
Whether the Jury, Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses forbid a death sentence imposed after a jury has found “sufficient aggravating circumstances” by a bare majority seven-to-five vote.
(1) Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding, contrary to this Court's decision in Demore v. Kim, that under United States v. Salerno, a denial of bail is permissible “only” after individualized assessments of flight risk or future dangerousness, thereby barring categorical denials of bail such as Arizona's Proposition 100 and calling into question categorical bans on bail in non-capital cases that exist in seventeen other states (and perhaps even calling into question categorical bans on bail in capital cases that exist in an additional twenty-two states); (2) whether, when adopting a categorical ban on bail for illegal aliens charged with serious felonies, a state may rely on logical assumptions, testimonial evidence of front-line prosecutors, and other anecdotal evidence that is in conformity with the empirical evidence of heightened flight risk by those unlawfully present in this country contained in studies conducted elsewhere, similar to what this Court has approved in analogous contexts, seeCity of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., or whether the state must conduct its own empirical analysis that is both jurisdiction- and category-specific in order to meet the requirements of Due Process; and (3) whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that Proposition 100 was facially unconstitutional, contrary to Salerno's requirement that a statute is facially invalid only if “no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,” because among those categorically denied bail by Arizona’s Proposition, 100 are individuals charged with capital crimes, whom the Ninth Circuit recognized could categorically be denied bail.
On Monday at 9:30 a.m. we expect orders from the April 24 Conference. We expect one or more opinions in argued cases at 10 a.m. on Wednesday. We will be live-blogging beginning at 9:45.
This is the second week of the April sitting. On Tuesday the Court will hear oral argument in Obergefell v. Hodges, which is consolidated with three other cases, on the questions of whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires that states grant and/or recognize same-sex marriages. We will be live-blogging updates from the oral argument beginning at 11 a.m.
Glossip v. Gross The constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment of using a sedative as the first drug in a death penalty protocol.