Sitting Docket Title(link to Wiki page) Issue Argument(link to transcript) Decision(link to opinion)
16-679McFadden v. United States(1) Whether and under what circumstances overwhelming evidence of an element omitted from a criminal jury instruction is a sufficient basis for finding the error harmless; and (2) whether proof that the defendant knew the name and physiological effects of the product he was selling compels a jury to conclude that the defendant “knew he was dealing with a ‘controlled substance’” as required by McFadden v. United States. (Opinion by )
16-575Harris v. Hahn(1) Whether the Constitution's equal protection and fundamental right to travel rights will tolerate a state benefit program that creates fixed and permanent distinctions between similarly-situated residents based on their length or timing of residence in the state; and (2) whether Texas' Hazelwood Act's “fixed-point residency requirement” therefore offends the Constitution. (Opinion by )
16-572Citizens Against Reservation Shopping v. Jewell(1) Whether, under the Indian Reorganization Act, to have been a “recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934, a tribe must have been “recognized” at that time; and (2) whether, to have been “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934, a tribe must have been located in Indian country—that is, on land over which the United States exercised jurisdiction to the exclusion of state jurisdiction. (Opinion by )
16-567American Business USA Corp. v. Florida Department of RevenueWhether a state can collect sales tax on out-of-state property ordered over the internet for out-of-state delivery, by relying on this court's decision in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota and the state's connection to the corporation that accepts the order and arranges the sale, or whether such a tax violates both the due process clause and dormant commerce clause of the United States Constitution by imposing a sales tax on the out-of-state transfer of tangible personal property. (Opinion by )
15-8114Tyler v. Louisiana(1) Whether, when counsel fully concedes the client's guilt to all charges over the client's express objection, counsel's performance amounts to a complete failure to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing so that the United States v. Cronic prejudice standard applies (as every other state and federal court to consider the question has held), or whether the Strickland v. Washington prejudice standard applies (as the lower court in this case held); (2) whether the petitioner's 14th Amendment rights under Boykin v. Alabama and Brookhart v. Janis were violated when his counsel entered the “functional equivalent of a guilty plea” to first-degree murder over his objections; (3) whether the petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to self-representation under Faretta v. California was violated when the trial court did not explain that the petitioner had the right to represent himself when he tried unsuccessfully to fire his attorneys; and (4) whether, in a capital case, the defense counsel who concedes guilt after failing to investigate and present a readily available innocence defense against his client's express wishes renders ineffective assistance under Strickland. (Opinion by )
Term Snapshot