Posted on May 28, 2011 at 11:21 am by Amy Burns
The federal witness tampering statute, 18 U.S.C. Â§ 1512(a)(1)(C), makes it a crime â€œto kill another person, with intent to. . . prevent the communication by any person to a [Federal] law enforcement officerâ€ of â€œinformation relating to the . . . possible commission of a Federal offense.â€ A related provision, Section 1512(g)(2), provides that no particular state of mind need be proved with respect to the fact that â€œthe law enforcement officer is an officer or employee of the Federal Government.â€ In other words, the would-be recipient of the communication must be a federal officer, but the defendant need not know that.
The petitioner in this case, Charles Andrew Fowler, killed a local police officer who had discovered him while he was preparing to rob a bank. Although there was evidence that Fowler intended to kill the police officer to prevent him from exposing the robbery scheme, it was not clear that Fowler specifically envisioned that the police officer would inform federal agents of the planned crime. Rather, it appeared that Fowlerâ€™s goal was to prevent the officer from informingÂ law enforcement officials in general. He was convicted under the witness-tampering statute. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the government needed to show only that a â€œpossible or potentialâ€ communication by the witness to federal authorities.
In an opinion by Justice Breyer that was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Sotomayor, and Kagan, the Court vacated and remanded the Eleventh Circuitâ€™s decision.Â It held that a showing of a possible or potential communication to federal authorities by the victim was not sufficient for a conviction under the witness-tampering statute. Instead, the statute requires a â€œreasonable likelihoodâ€ that the would-be recipient of the information was a federal official.
In its opinion, the Court begins by noting that the statute must cover an intent to prevent communication with law enforcement officials generally (rather than merely communications with a specific person), because the most serious witness tampering may occur before any communication to specific officials has occurred or been contemplated. Once that general intent is established, the Court explained, the relevant question then becomes what standard the government must meet to show that the would-be recipients of the witnessâ€™s information included federal officials.
As an initial matter, the Court rejects both the â€œreasonable doubtâ€ and â€œpreponderance of the evidenceâ€ standards; because the relevant factor is the defendantâ€™s intent, the actual outcome need not be particularly certain. (In the Courtâ€™s opinion, for example, Justice Breyer notes that one can go to Fenway Park with the intent of seeing the Red Sox, even if they are not playing that day and there is thus very little chance of actually seeing them play.)
The Court similarly rejects the opposite extreme â€“ that proof of broad intent to prevent communication with any and all law enforcement officials is itself sufficient. The Court explains that one cannot, unless there is a mistake, intend to prevent something that had no chance of happening anyway; moreover, if the statute did not require any showing of ties to federal officials, it would sweep a large amount of tampering in purely state investigations under its reach.
In seeking some middle ground, the Court then turns to the dictionary for a definition of the word â€œprevent,â€ which supplies three possible standards: â€œintended,â€ was â€œpossible,â€ or was â€œlikely.â€ It rejects the first out of hand, because it would refer to the victimâ€™s intent, which may not have been formed and would not be relevant in the case of a crime that would obviously involve a federal investigation, regardless whether the witness knew it. The second option, â€œpossible,â€ invokes the standard adopted by the Eleventh Circuit, but the Court also rejects this standard, deeming it insufficient to maintain the â€œbasically federalâ€ scope of the statute.
This leaves â€œlikelyâ€ â€“ which the Court fashions into the standard that it ultimately articulates:Â it must be â€œreasonably likely under the circumstances that (in the absence of the killing) at least one of the relevant communications would have been made to a federal officer.â€ Because the lower courts did not evaluate Fowlerâ€™s claim under this standard, the Court vacated the decision below and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment only. In his view, the statute requires a showing beyond a reasonable doubt that a communication would have been made to a federal law enforcement officer. He first acknowledges that the statute is ambiguous as to whether it requires the defendant to specifically intend that the law enforcement officer to whom the potential communication is made be a federal one. But he finds clarity in a separate provision of the witness-tampering statute, which specifies that the defendant need not have any particular state of mind with regard to the recipientâ€™s status as a federal officer. Having noted that the statute requires no particular mens rea with regard to the federal character of the intended recipient, he concludes that the statuteâ€™s requirement that the officer be a federal one must instead define the actus reus of the crime, and, accordingly, must be â€œan element of the facts that must be proved for conviction.â€ Justice Scalia notes that the Court has never used a â€œlikelihoodâ€ standard for elements of crimes before; in his view, it should not do so here. Any lower standard, he suggests, would convert what should be state murder prosecutions into federal crimes and would violate the rule of lenity. Finally, he complains that the new standard is confusing and vague.
Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg, in which he argues that the Eleventh Circuitâ€™s â€œpossible or potentialâ€ standard is correct. In his dissent, Justice Alito enumerates the things that the statute does not require to be proved: that the victim would have reported what he saw to anyone (much less a federal officer), that the defendant had a particular law enforcement officer in mind as the recipient of the information, or that the defendant knew that the potential â€œgenericâ€ recipient officer was a federal officer. All that matters, Justice Alito explains, is that the â€œgenericâ€ recipient officer is in fact a federal officer. Justice Alito disputes Justice Breyerâ€™s conclusion that a rational person will not act to prevent something unless it is â€œreasonably likely;â€ instead, Justice Alito argues, it is perfectly rational to act to prevent something that is possible, whether it is â€œreasonably likelyâ€ or not.